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ABSTRACT
MOOD AND CREATIVITY: THE MEDIATING ROLE OF ATTENTION

Viktoria Tidikis
Old Dominion University, 2012
Director: Dr. Ivan Ash

Within literature there are two opposing views regarding the role of emotions in the
creative process. The most commonly held view contends that positive emotions enhance
creativity, while negative emotions stifle it; yet, some studies show an opposite trend. To
help resolve this conundrum, this research examined the mediating effect of attention on
the relationship between mood and creativity. The results showed that positive
deactivating and negative activating emotions led to broader attention, while positive
activating and negative deactivating emotions caused narrowing of attention.
Furthermore, the creative process is not uniform in its requirements of attentional
breadth; some creative tasks require broad and others narrow attention for their
completion. When differential requirements for global versus local attentional focus at
the differing stages of creativity were taken into consideration, the influence of emotions
become more straightforward; different attentional breadth requirements corresponded to
differential stages of creative performance.
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INTRODUCTION
The current research investigates how emotions affect creativity processes and
whether attentional breadth plays a mediating role in that. This question is investigated
using a multi-stage creativity model paradigm. To test this question, emotional valence
and arousal levels were manipulated and their effect on different measures of creativity
and attentional breadth were measured.
First, this paper reviews existing research regarding the relationships connecting
mood, attention, and creativity. Second, it discusses how conflicting findings within the
literature might be explained by use of a multi-stage creativity model. Third, a study that
manipulates mood and arousal, and measures the effect on multiple measures of
creativity and attention is reported. And finally, these results are discussed in terms of
current theories of creative cognitive processes and attentional breadth.
The Role of Emotions in the Creative Process
The importance of emotions in the creative process has been fully appreciated
since ancient times throughout western civilization. The link between emotions and
creativity has been well documented through a host of anecdotal evidence, self-reports of
prominent artists and scientists alike, as well as empirical research. Despite
overwhelming agreement that emotions play an important role in the creative process,
little agreement exists as to what type of emotions enhance and what type of emotions
stifle creativity. Three distinct views exist. The first holds that positive emotions enhance,
while negative emotions stifle creativity (e.g., meta-analytical study by Davis, 2009). The
second proposes the opposite, that negative emotions promote creativity, while positive
emotions suppress it (e.g., Akinola & Mendes, 2008),). Yet, a third view posits that both
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positive and negative emotions are necessary for the creative process to occur (e.g., metaanalytical study by Baas, De Dreu & Nijstad, 2008). Consequently, on one hand, there is
an overwhelming body of evidence linking positive affect with creativity; many
researchers finding evidence of artists and scientists alike experiencing states during the
creative process, which are described as "flow" (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990), complete
absorption in the present moment (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2009), elation,
emotional high, and even giddiness (Schuldberg, 1994).
On the other hand, multiple anecdotal evidence suggests that negative emotions
are vastly more important for creativity than are positive emotions. Such prominent
creators as Robert Shumann, Hector Berlioz, Winston Churchill, Van Gogh, among many
others, were diagnosed with mood and personality disorders such as depression, bipolar
disorder, and schizophrenia (Bowden, 1994). Yet other evidence suggests that the
creative process is marked by both positive and negative affect simultaneously
(Shuldberg, 1994). Both artists and scientists report experiencing heightened positive and
negative emotions at the same time during peak creative experiences (Shaw & Runco,
1994).
Abele (1992) suggested that there are two ways in which mood affects creativity:
one is through affecting task motivation by affecting interest to engage in a task, and
another is through affecting cognitive functioning. The current study concentrates on the
effects of mood on cognitive functioning. It has been shown that positive mood broadens
attention, while negative mood narrows it (e.g., Gasper & Clore, 2002; Fredrickson &
Branigan, 2005). A link between attention and creativity has also been established.
Breadth of attention has been shown to influence performance on creative tasks (e.g.,

3

N^cka, 1999; Mendelsohn, 1976; Kasof, 1997). Thus, it is conceivable that mood can
influence creativity through attention, by broadening or narrowing attentional focus,
which in turn, affects creative task performance.
In the present study mood was manipulated by presenting the participants with a
series of emotion-educing images designed to elicit either positive or negative emotions
at differing arousal levels. The effects of emotions across different arousal levels were
measured on a set of attention and creativity tasks. Attention tasks were designed to
measure the attentional breadth, while creativity tasks were designed to capture different
facets of the creative process.
Studying Creativity
Creativity is a multifaceted construct and is generally conceptualized as the
"generation of ideas, insights, or problem solutions that are both novel and potentially
useful" (Baas, de Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008, p. 780). While novelty and usefulness are
necessary, they are not in themselves sufficient conditions for creativity. For example,
ideas can be novel, yet nonsensical. Additionally, ideas must be appropriate and valid
(Vosburg and Kaufman, 1999). According to Kaufman (1993), validity encompasses the
significance and meaningfulness of an idea, the internal consistency of a theoretical
model, the esthetic value of an artistic products, functionality of a device, or a novel
social practice. Another important component of creativity is the rejection or
modification of previously accepted ideas. Boden (1991) described this as "thinking the
impossible" or a fundamental departure from "the basic rules of a particular conceptual
space" (Vosburg & Kaufman, 1999, p. 20).
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Multiple theories have been put forth to explain how creative ideas are developed.
Some theorists (Mendelsohn, 1976; Mednick, 1962) proposed that creative individuals
differ from those less creative by their ability to access larger amounts of various mental
concepts. This ability greatly depends on an individual's ability to control attention. The
more stimuli an individual can simultaneously attend to, or the more defocused one's
attention is, the more creative the individual (Mendelsohn, 1976).
One of the most important questions in creativity research is how to study and
measure it. Different approaches to studying creativity have evolved throughout history:
mystical, pragmatic, psychodynamic, psychometric, cognitive, social-personality, and
multidisciplinary (Sternberg & Lubart, 1999). Proponents of the psychometric approach
(Guilford, 1950) were the first to propose that creativity can be studied employing
everyday participants using paper-and-pencil tasks. While this approach was a
breakthrough in creativity studies and made it possible to study different components of
creativity in the laboratory, it ignored the complexity of the creative process. Researchers
applying a cognitive approach to studying creativity tried to understand how mental
representations are formed and what cognitive processes underlie creativity. Based on a
cognitive approach, Finke, Ward, and Smith (1992) created the Geneplore model, which
presents creativity as a two-stage process. The first stage is generative and is associated
with the construction of mental representations. The second stage is exploratory, during
which the mental representations constructed during the first stage foster the appearance
of novel and creative ideas. A social-personality approach looked at personality and
motivational variables, as well as the sociocultural environment as triggers of creativity.
While both cognitive and social-personality approaches have contributed separately to
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creativity research, few studies have sought to integrate the two. Later approaches have
attempted to correct this shortcoming by proposing that multiple components need to
converge in order for the creative process to occur (Sternberg & Lubart, 1999).
Creativity has been measured using widely different methods, such as divergent
thinking and idea generation tasks, insight problems, as well as employing subjective
ratings of creativity (Baas, de Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008). A question arises of whether these
differing measures are measuring the same construct. For example, divergent thinking
tasks are open-ended and measure the ability to produce multiple unorthodox ideas
(Mumford, 2001). Whereas, insight problems have only one possible solution, and
require restructuring of the problem's mental representation in order to successfully solve
it (Simonton, 2003). Yet other studies asked participants to write a poem, draw a picture,
or perform another loosely defined task; participants' performance was then subjectively
appraised by independent judges using some kind of scale (e.g., Simonton, 2003). Since
different psychological processes might be responsible for different aspects of creative
performance, it is questionable whether these varying tasks provide a measurement for
the same underlying construct (Baas, de Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008). Hence, different
emotional and attentional states might differentially influence performance on various
tasks.
In the current study, multiple facets of creativity were measured using two
problem types: insight and open-ended problems. For insight problems, solution credit
was given if the problem was correctly solved. For open-ended problems, there was no
right or wrong answer; for these problems, the solution's creative quality was measured
using fluency, originality and usefulness measures. For both problem types there were
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two subtypes, each requiring either a broad or narrow attentional focus in order to
achieve a successful solution. Thus, different problems were selected to represent
different stages of the creative process; problems requiring a broad attentional focus were
designed to simulate the early stages of creativity, while problems requiring a narrow
attentional focus were designed to simulate later stages of the creative process.
De fining Affect
Affective phenomenon is most commonly described as emotion, mood and affect.
Emotion is usually directed towards a specific stimulus, and is characterized as being
intense, but short lasting. Mood is generally seen as being more durable and persistent,
but usually of a lower intensity. Affect is the most general of the three, referring to the
most enduring, long-lasting mood states (Baas, de Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008). Despite the
distinction, these three terms are often used interchangeably in research. There are
numerous dimensions in which mood differs, however, three most studied dimensions are
hedonic tone, activation, and approach/avoidance orientation. Hedonic tone refers to the
valence of emotions, that is whether it is positive or negative. Activation refers to
whether the emotion is calming and deactivating (e.g., calm, relaxed, sad), or activating
(e.g., happy, elated, angry, fearful). Based on these two dimensions, moods can be both
positive or negative, and activating or deactivating (Baas, de Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008).
These two dimensions have applicability to temporary moods as well as trait-related
differences in emotional states; such as extraversion being related to positive and
activating states. The difference between approach and avoidance orientation is based on
the regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997; Idson, Liberman, & Higgins, 2000) that
distinguishes between promotion focus and prevention focus. Approach/avoidance
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orientation has mostly been studied in relation to more enduring traits and personality
characteristics.
Breadth of Attention
Kasof (1997) referred to breadth of attention as "the number and range of stimuli
attended to at any one time" (p.303). People exhibiting a narrow state of attention focus
on a relatively small range of stimuli and filter irrelevant stimuli from their awareness.
Conversely, people having a broad state of attention focus on a large range of stimuli and
tend to be more aware of irrelevant stimuli. In the field of visual attention research,
Navon (1977) pointed out that the breadth of attention corresponds to the way
information is processed: broad, or global attention, corresponds to global-to-local, or
top-down information processing, which is how humans tend to process information
under normal circumstances. Gestalt psychologists posited that humans process
information holistically, a view that was later developed into the global-precedence
hypothesis that was supported by a multitude of research (Kimchi, 1992). However, later
research disputes the inevitability of top-down processing (e.g., Van der Stigchel,
Belopolsky, Peters, Wijnen, Meeter, & Theeuwes, 2009). For example, Van der Stigchel
et al. argue that initially information is briefly processed in a bottom-up manner, and only
then do top-down processes assume control. Top-down processing can also influence the
size of attentional window, i.e., broaden or narrow attention based on the demands of the
environment. A similar distinction has been made in perceptual processing research
between contextually and conceptually driven processing (Reicher, 1969). Contextual
processing is guided by sensory information, which corresponds to a narrowing of
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attention on a task; while conceptually driven processing is guided by concepts stored in
long-term memory, which corresponds to broad attentional focus.
Mood and Creative Thinking
Overall, there is a large body of literature showing the positive relationship
between positive emotions and creativity. Conversely, a substantial number of studies
demonstrate a positive relationship between negative emotions and creativity, and a
negative relationship between positive emotions and creativity. One explanation for these
inconsistencies might be that various studies used different methods to induce mood,
which would enhance different components of the mood construct. If we treat mood as a
multidimensional construct with different correlates (Baas, de Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008),
then it is conceivable that diverse mood induction methods activate different segments of
the mood construct. The same applies to the creativity construct and its measures:
differing tasks might in fact measure disparate aspects of the creative process.
Effects of Positive Mood on Creativity
Overall the effect of positive mood on the creative process is well established
throughout creativity literature; multiple studies found that positive mood enhances
creativity on an array of differing tasks. Specifically, positive emotions appear to enhance
performance on tasks requiring broad, defocused attention more so than on those
requiring a narrow, concentrated scope of attention.
A meta-analysis by Baas, De Dreu and Nijstad (2008) examined mood and
creativity research conducted between 1984 and 2008. The authors tested whether there
were differences between positive and neutral, negative and neutral, and positive and
negative moods in their effect on creativity by examining 102 effect sizes. Overall, they
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found that positive moods were more conducive to creativity than neutral moods and that
there was no significant difference between negative and neutral moods, or positive and
negative moods. However, when the authors coded for separate components of creativity,
such as eureka/insight tasks, flexibility, fluency, and originality; a more complicated
pattern emerged. When examined separately, the authors found a significant difference
between positive and negative, and positive and neutral moods for eureka/insight tasks.
Positive moods were associated with more creativity than were neutral or negative
moods; however, no difference was found between negative and neutral moods. For the
flexibility, fluency and originality components of creativity there was significant
difference for all three contrasts (between negative and neutral, positive and neutral, and
positive and negative moods). Positive mood was associated with more creativity than
were neutral or negative moods, and negative mood was associated with more creativity
than was neutral mood.
Yet another meta-analysis examined a total of 72 studies in order to evaluate
whether positive moods enhance creativity (Davis, 2009). Overall, this study found a
significant effect between positive and negative, and positive and neutral moods; with
positive mood being associated with higher creativity. No difference was found between
neutral and negative moods. Davis' study also found that these effects were dependent on
the type of creative task used. The author separated task types into two categories:
ideation and problem-solving. The results showed that there was a significant difference
for positive versus negative, and positive versus neutral moods for ideation tasks, but not
for problem-solving tasks. Thus, problem-solving performance was not affected by
differential mood states. Furthermore, there was a more robust difference between
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positive and neutral than between positive and negative moods for ideation task creativity
enhancement.
In a series of studies, Isen and colleagues investigated the effects of mood on
creative performance. In their 1984 study, Isen and Daubman examined the influence of
mood on categorization. In a pilot study, aimed at establishing a relationship between
positive mood and categorization, the participants were induced with positive
deactivating mood. A categorization task, used as a dependent measure, required the
participants to pick an exemplar that was the most representative of a given category, and
then rate these items based on how closely they represented a category. The results of the
study were mixed, only about half the time did participants in the deactivating positive
affect condition were more likely to rate unusual exemplars as members of a category.
The following study included both positive and negative mood conditions. No
information about whether mood was activating or deactivating was recorded. The results
showed that participants in the positive mood condition rated more poor exemplars as
category members, and likewise rated them higher than controls. A similar trend was
found for the negative mood group, however, the effect did not reach the customary
significance level. In a subsequent experiment, Isen and Daubman found no difference in
the number of categories that the participants created in the positive and negative mood
conditions, however, these both conditions created significantly fewer categories than the
control group. While a lack of significant effect for the negative mood condition hindered
further investigation, the authors' interpretation of these findings was that negative affect
might influence categorization in the same manner as positive affect.
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In the next study, Isen, Johnson, Mertz, and Robinson (1985) looked at the effect
of positive mood on word associations. Creativity was measured by the unusualness of
word associations. Results showed that people within the positive affect condition
produced a greater amount of unusual word associations than did people in the neutral
condition. Thus positive mood led to better performance on divergent thinking tasks,
which required a broadening of attention.
In a four-experiment study Isen, Daubman, and Nowicki (1987) looked at mood
effects on creativity using candle task (Duncker, 1945) and the Remote Associates Test
[(RAT) Mednick, Mednick, & Mednick, 1964)]. The study included positive, negative,
and neutral mood groups, as well as high arousal group, in which arousal was induced by
asking participants to exercise for two minutes. Participants in the positive mood
condition solved more candle problems than any other group. No difference in problem
solving time was detected among the groups. A comparison of the positive affect
condition (induced by gift giving) with the neutral condition revealed that participants in
the positive mood condition solved significantly more medium-difficulty items on RAT,
than did participants in the control group. No difference was found for low- or highdifficult items. In another experiment comparing a positive group (shown a comedy video
clip) with a control and arousal group (exercise), there was a significant RAT score
difference between the positive and control groups, but not between the positive and
arousal groups. Thus, while the study found a solid effect of positive mood on solving a
candle task across conditions, only in one out of three conditions on the RAT task similar
effect was found.
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A possible explanation for these results might be that the two tasks were tapping
into different components of creativity. While the candle task is universally accepted as a
measure of divergent thinking (Duncker, 1945), the question of whether the RAT task is a
measure of divergent or convergent thinking still remains open, many consider RAT to be
more closely related to convergent rather than divergent thinking (e.g., Taft & Rossiter,
1966). Overall, the study found that positive mood aided performance on creativity
measures, however, the effects of positive mood did not differ from the effects of arousal.
Finally, since only one out of four experiments in this study used a negative mood
condition, a decisive conclusion cannot be reached regarding the effects of negative
mood on creativity, or lack of thereof, based on this study.
Abele's (1992) study analyzed the effects of various moods on verbal creativity
tasks. The researcher used unusual uses (UU) and fictitious situation (FS) tests as
measures of creativity. The UU test was intended as a low instrumental task; herein,
participants were asked to produce as many unusual uses as possible for and empty can
and ordinary string. The FS test measured "logical extrapolation of experiences into a
novel situation" (p.206) and was considered a high instrumental interest task; participants
were instructed to produce as many ideas as possible for the fictitious situation of "what
would happen if one were able to listen to [another] person's secret thoughts (p. 207).
The results showed that positive mood increases ideation fluency across both tasks;
whereas negative mood increased ideation fluency on a high instrumental interest task,
but not on a low instrumental interest task. In this study, it is possible to compare high
and low instrumental tasks in terms of the breadth of attention required throughout the
performance of each. The high instrumental task called for narrower attention than did
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the low instrumental task, as it asked participants to deal with a concrete situation, and
then extrapolate analytically from it to a wider domain, thus engaging "tighter", more
analytical, and "bottom up" processes. Conversely, the low instrumental task entailed
broader attention, as it required participants to find any unusual use for an object, thus
engaging looser, "top down" information processing.
Subramaniam, Kounios, Parrish, and Jung-Beeman's (2008) study looked at the
effects of different levels of mood on insight problem solving. There was no mood
induction in this study; participants were separated into three equal groups based on the
valence of their moods as measured during the experiment. A top, middle, and bottom
groups were created, thus authors treated mood as a uni-dimensional variable. RAT was
used as a measure of creativity. The researchers found that participants in the top third
mood condition solved more problems than did the participants in the other two
conditions. Of interest here, they found that positive mood was related to the strategy that
participants used to solve problems. The number of insights was significantly different
across the three mood conditions, however, the number of problems solved analytically
did not differ. Anxiety had an opposite effect, participants with highest anxiety levels
solved fewer problems with insight than participants lowest on anxiety; thus, anxiety was
negatively correlated with solving problems via insight. However, anxiety did not affect
the raw number of analytical solutions obtained. These findings fall in line with
suggestions made by Abele (1992) that "intuitive" problems benefit from positive affect,
but not analytical problems. The results of this study also serve to explain why metaanalytical studies (Baas, de Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008; Davis, 2009) found no reliable effect
of mood on insight problems. While mood affects what strategy a person may use to
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solve an insight problem, because different people might solve insight problems using
different strategies; in the end, there will be no difference in the number of problems
solved. This study also found that anxiety, activating negative affect, enhanced the
proportion of solutions achieved analytically. This effect might also be contributed to a
narrowing of attentional focus.
Contrary to the results of other studies, Clapham's (2001) study found no
evidence for mood effects on divergent thinking. In this study, mood was induced using a
list of statements, each of which corresponded to a treatment condition. In the positive
affect condition, the statements grow increasingly positive, ending with statements such
as "This is great...I really do feel good. I am elated about things!" and "I'm full of
energy!" (Clapham, p. 341). In the negative affect condition, the statements become
increasingly negative, ending with expressions such as "All of the unhappiness of my
past life is taking possession of me" and "1 want to go to sleep and never wake up"
(Clapham, p. 341). The study used the TTCT-Figural (Torrance, 1966) as a measure of
divergent thinking in which test takers were asked to use abstract sketches to form
pictures. For example, test takers were asked to use a circle to draw whatever they
choose. The study found that positive mood did not facilitate performance on divergent
thinking measures. Conversely, negative mood was not found to impede performance,
either. The authors speculated that the failure to find significant differences among
treatment conditions may have been due to the fact that mood manipulation was too
weak, particularly for the negative mood condition, to produce significant changes.
Vosburg (1998a) examined the effects of positive and negative mood on
divergent-thinking tasks. Mood and arousal were assessed at the beginning of experiment
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using an adjective checklist. Divergent thinking was measured by tasks that asked
participants to respond to various real-life scenarios, which measured two distinct
components of divergent thinking: problem finding and problem solving. They found that
overall positive mood was positively related, and negative mood was negatively related
to the task performance for both problem finding and problem solving. No effect of
arousal was detected. In another study using the same measures, Vosburg (1998b) tested
a hypothesis that positive mood should foster the amount, but not the quality, of produced
ideas. The hypothesis was supported, i.e., positive mood was significantly related to the
quantity of ideas factor, encompassing fluency and flexibility components, but not to the
quality of ideas factor, which measured originality and usefulness of produced ideas.
In summary, while the prevailing view in mood-creativity research is that positive
mood induces creativity uniformly across a wide variety of tasks (e.g., meta-analytical
study by Baas, De Dreu & Nijstad, 2008), closer examination of the results of separate
studies reveal a far more complicated pattern. Differing results of mood influence on
creativity are obtained on different creativity measures. For example, results of mood
influence on RAT task are contradictory, with not all studies showing a solid
performance improvement (Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987). Additionally, other
studies (Vosburg, 1998b) found that positive mood affects differentially various
components of creativity. For example, it is related to the quantity, but not quality of
produced ideas. The mood induction technique appears to matter as well, as not all
induction procedures produce enough change in mood states to evoke significant change
in creative thinking. Some methodological shortfalls of the aforementioned studies might
also be responsible for their contradictory results, such as failure to include negative
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mood condition within the experiment, limiting comparison to only positive and control
groups (e.g., Isen, Johnson, Mertz, & Robinson, 1985), or weak mood induction
techniques (Clapham, 2001). Overall, the general conclusion is that positive mood has a
consistent effect of benefitting performance on tasks that require broad attentional focus,
however, on tasks requiring narrow attentional focus the effects of positive mood are far
less clear.
Negative Emotions and Creativity
Not all researchers are in agreement that positive emotions necessarily enhance
creativity while negative emotions stifle it. Historical data suggests that many highly
creative people suffered from depression as well as other mental disorders. Indeed,
multiple studies found links between creativity and mental disorders, in particular bipolar
disorder (e.g., Andreasen, 1987; Jamison, 1989; Richards, Kinney, Daniels, & Linkins,
1992), hypomania (e.g., Jamison, Gerner, Hammen, & Padesky, 1980; Schuldberg,
1990), depression (e.g., Slaby, 1992), and schizophrenia (e.g., Keefe & Magaro, 1980;
Sass, 2001), thus suggesting that negative affect might be conducive to creative
processes.
Among other studies, a study by Akinola and Mendes (2008), [that in fact was
excluded from the Baas, De Dreu and Nijstad (2008) meta-analysis, omission justified by
asserting that Akinola and Mendes study was singular in its findings], found that higher
artistic creativity was associated with negative moods more so than with positive moods.
The researchers used the Abbreviated Torrance Test for Adults as a base line measure of
creativity. Each participant was asked to make "interesting" and "unusual" pictures using
nine triangles. Mood was then manipulated using social approval/rejection task, in which
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participants received either positive or negative feedback. During their second creativity
task participants were asked to make an artistic collage using a piece of cardboard, a
bottle of glue, a bottle of glitter, and pieces of felt and paper of various shapes and size.
The participants' creativity was then assessed by experienced artists. Collages created by
participants in the social rejection condition were judged as being the most creative, with
ratings differing significantly from the control and social approval conditions.
Interestingly, ratings in the social approval condition were even lower than those in the
control condition, although this difference did not reach statistical significance.
Kaufmann and Vosburg's (1997) research examined the effect of positive and
negative moods on creative and analytic problem solving performance. Their study found
a negative relationship between positive mood and creative problem solving. They used
two insight problems as a measure of creativity. The first problem was a Two String
problem, in which the task was to tie two widely separated strings hanging from the
ceiling. Since it was impossible to grasp both stings at the same time, the insight into the
problem was to tie available tools to the strings, and then use a pendulum movement to
grab a hold of both strings. The second insight problem dealt with figuring out the
construction a solid rack from two sticks and a C-clamp. The correct solution involved
wedging the sticks together and using the C-clamp as a peg. Analytical performance was
measured with a standard word-analogy task, and yet another problem required the
detection of a rule behind a numbering sequence. Mood was manipulated by showing
participants a 10 minute, positive or negative video clip. The results showed that negative
mood enhanced performance while positive mood led to significantly poorer performance
on both creative problems. Analytic problem-solving performance was not affected by
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different affective states. The study's findings that positive mood effects are detrimental
to insight problem solving contradict sharply with most research in this domain. The
findings particularly contradict with the Isen et al. (1987) study that used very similar
task, but which found an exact opposite trend.
Another Kaufmann and Vosburg study (2002) tested the hypothesis that positive
and negative moods might have different effect on creative problem solving as a function
of constraint on the solution space of a task. Contrary to their previous study, they found
that on divergent thinking tasks positive mood enhanced performance overall; yet over
time, positive affect caused a decline in creative problem-solving performance, while
negative affect was associated with greater idea production later in the process. In their
experiment, the authors used a mood induction technique developed by Martin et al.
(1993). First, participants were shown video clips to induce either negative or positive
emotions, followed by a video clip from the film Speed, which was intended to arouse
the participants in order to enhance mood induction. No films were shown to the control
group. Creativity was assessed using four measures of divergent thinking. One was a
problem-finding task, where participants were asked to come up with possible scenarios
that lead to a problem described in a vignette. The second task was a problem-solving
task where participants had to list all the solutions to the problem in the same vignette.
The third task was to list all possible uses for a shoe, and in the last task, participants
were presented with an ambiguous visual figure and were asked to list all possibilities of
what that figure might represent. The results indicated a crossed interaction between
positive/negative mood, and early/late idea production. Positive mood led to better
performance in the first minute of problem solving, however, performance in the positive
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mood condition declined sharply after that, and at minute four participants in the positive
mood condition were performing worse than participants in the negative and control
group conditions. Thus, positive mood led to superior idea production initially, however,
caused a decline in idea production during the later stages of performance. The flat
association gradient that participants showed in the negative condition was similar to the
gradient that Mednick (1962) characterized as indicative of creativity. On the other hand,
participants in the positive mood condition showed a steep response gradient that
Mednick associated with less creativity.
Kaufman stated "[the above] findings are consistent with results showing positive
mood to increase fluency in divergent thinking tasks" (Kaufman, 2003, p. 132). However,
he added, the argument that positive mood uniformly improves performance on divergent
thinking tasks cannot be applied to every instance, and he called for a more complex
understanding of creativity. Because creativity is a multifaceted construct, different
moods may affect various components of creativity differently.
Jausovec's (1989) study analyzed whether positive emotions enhanced analogical
transfer on insight problems. The study found that positive mood increased analogical
problem solving on ill-defined problems, but that positive affect was detrimental to
performance on well-defined problems. Creativity was measured with two types of
problems: ill-defined and well-defined. Ill-defined problems required participants to
relate information given by the problem to other areas of a knowledge base, thus
requiring an expansion of their attention, thinking globally, and using a top-down
information processing approach in order to successfully solve the problem. The study
found that positive affect aided analogical transfer on these types of problems. Well-
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defined problems, on the other hand, required participants to focus their attention only on
the information given by the problem, no search of other knowledge was required in
order to solve the problem. The results indicated that in fact positive affect hurt
analogical transfer on well-defined problems.
Wayne and Runco (1994) examined the link between divergent thinking and
suicide ideation. Suicide ideation was assessed by questionnaire in a sample of university
students. Divergent thinking was assessed by asking participants to respond to scenarios
of real-life problems, like late homework, or unplanned pregnancy. Responses were
scored for fluency, flexibility and originality. The study found a significant relationship
between divergent thinking and suicide ideation. In particular, suicide ideation was
positively associated with problem generation fluency, but negatively associated with
problem solving flexibility. Thus, suicide-prone participants showed a greater ability in
finding problems, which has been shown to be an important component in the creative
process (Nickerson, 1999).
Adaman and Blaney (1995) investigated the effects of musical mood induction on
creativity. Mood was induced by playing 20-minute audio-clips that were designed to
induce elated, depressed or neutral moods, a technique developed by Pignatiello, Camp,
and Rasar (1986). Creativity was measured with the subset of the Torrance Tests of
Creative Thinking (TTCT; Torrance, 1966). The researchers hypothesized that
participants in the elation mood condition would score higher on creativity measures than
would participants in the neutral or depression condition. Contrary to expectations, both
the elated and depressed groups scored significantly higher than the controls. The authors
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speculated that intensity of feeling, or activation might have a stronger influence on
creativity than hedonic tone.
Gasper (2004) tested the hypothesis that sad moods inhibit generative thought
through affecting an individual's ability to use accessible, old ideas, as well as novel
ideas, and by restricting access to available material in a memory. In a series of three
experiments, the author tested this hypothesis, using similar method. Mood was
manipulated by asking participants to write about either a sad or happy life event. After
completing a crossword puzzle designed to_prime the participants with a set of solutions
for the generation task, they completed the generation task that asked them to come up
with as many as possible examples of "things that fly" (Gasper, p. 218). Old ideas were
operationalized as the primed words found within the crossword puzzle, while new ideas
were operationalized as ideas that had not appeared in the crossword puzzle. Contrary to
their prediction, mood did not influence the use of old solutions in the generative task.
Participants in a sad mood, however, generated fewer new responses than did participants
in the happy mood condition. This was taken as evidence that negative mood alters the
use of novel information, but not the use of information already stored in the memory.
Braverman (2005) investigated whether negative moods facilitate data driven
information processing, and whether positive moods promote a top-down information
processing approach, while decreasing attention to cognitive task. Mood manipulation
involved showing the participants either sad or happy video clip. Then each participant
was given the task of detecting covariation of facial features with different test scores.
The results showed that participants in a sad mood detected a greater amount of correct
covariation than did participants in a happy mood. This was taken as evidence of the
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tendency of a sad mood to influence more comprehensive scrutinizing of information. A
subsequent study also showed that motivation was responsible for differential covariation
detection in happy versus sad participants. Negative mood increased participants'
motivation to engage in a more thorough thinking process and pay closer attention to
details, which in turn led to more frequent correct hits. Thus, the hypothesis that sad
mood promotes focusing on a task and facilitates a data-driven information processing
approach, while happy mood detracts attention from the task at hand, was supported.
Andrews and Thomson (2009) proposed that negative emotional states serve a
valuable adaptive function. Using depression as an example, the authors showed it to be a
useful mechanism for the successful solving of complex problems. Depression makes
people ruminate over their problems, compelling them to revisit and analyze each
problem in excruciating detail. Analysis is a necessary step in problem solving, thus it is
advantageous to spend time doing so. However, there are many life distractions that
might redirect one's attention from problem analysis. Thus, the analytical rumination
hypothesis proposes that depression facilitates problem analysis by minimizing
distractions and sustaining analysis towards these problems. Since processing resources
are limited, it is achieved by: allocating cognitive resources to problem solving,
eliminating distractions by minimizing the appeal of problem-irrelevant activities; and
initiating psychomotor changes that minimize the ability to engage in distracting
activities.
Gasper (2003) investigated the hypothesis that people in a negative mood adhere
to data more so than do participants in a positive mood. The dependent variable in this
study was a mental set task (Luchins, 1942), requiring participants to form a word from a
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set of presented letters. Some of problems required a certain mental strategy to solve
them successfully (e.g., by using every second letter from a lettering set the solution for
GZOQAXT is GOAT), while others could be solved using a direct, more apparent
strategy (e.g., the solution for FYROOMG is ROOM). After presenting the participants
with a problem designed to break the established mental set, they were given problems
that could be solved using either one of the two strategies. The results indicated that
participants in the sad mood condition updated their approach to problem solving more
often than did participants in the positive or neutral mood condition, thus showing that
people in a sad mood adhered to data more so than did people in happy or neutral moods.
Smith, Michael, and Hocevar (1990) examined the effects of test anxiety on
creative thinking, predicting that it should interfere with divergent thinking. Anxiety was
induced by urging participants, middle school children, to do their absolute best,
emphasizing strict grading and the importance of correct responses, imposing a time
limit, and announcing monetary rewards for the top performers. The three creativity
measures in the study were: the verbal fluency test; the figural fluency measure; and the
mathematical fluency measure, which was designed to access the divergent production of
symbolic implications. The presence of anxiety did not result in lower verbal fluency and
figural fluency measure scores. Contrary to expectation, figural fluency test scores were
higher for the anxiety group than for the control group. This difference was only
marginally significant for a two-tail test, but would have reached customary significance
level for a one-tail test, assuming there was a-priory directional prediction. Anxiety
produced lower scores on the mathematical fluency measure as compared to the control
condition, however the difference was only significant for males, not for females.
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In summary, contrary to the widely held belief that negative emotions hinder
creativity, a more detailed examination of the literature revealed surprising results. First
of all, there are practically no studies asserting that negative emotions cause a decrease in
creativity. An exception was a singular experiment investigating mathematical fluency in
which anxiety was found to have negative effect on creativity, however, this effect was
significant only for males. More surprisingly, in some cases, negative emotions were
related to an increase in creative thinking across a wide variety of tasks. In particular,
negative mood was associated with better performance on tasks requiring top-down
information processing, focused attention, and data elaboration. Some authors suggest
that negative moods help performance through a narrowing of attentional focus on the
task at hand. Negative emotions also seem to have a motivational influence on a person's
performance by compelling them to pay greater attention to problem details, ignore
distractions, and engage in sustained problem analysis. However, the effects of mood on
creativity are fragile, and not always discernible in research. One reason for this might be
that negative mood manipulations are frequently insufficient in strength in laboratory
settings, due to the ethical concerns, among other reasons. Interestingly, some studies
found that positive mood hinders creativity, rather than promoting it, as widespread belief
suggests.
Mood and Attention
Early investigative work into the relationship between mood and attention
established that high negative emotional arousal causes a narrowing of attention.
Eastbrook (1959) speculated that negative affect high in avoidance motivation would
narrow attentional focus (Easterbrook, 1959), moreover, later studies supported this
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proposition. Baron, Moore and Sanders (1978) found that social stress, which can be
conceptualized as a highly activating negative mood, also caused a narrowing of
attentional focus. Wachtel (1968) found that participants who were threatened with
electrical shock, and had no means of avoiding it, exhibited a longer reaction time to
targets in the periphery of their visual field than did non-threatened participants, thus also
showing a narrowing of attentional focus. The results of Fenske and Eastwood's (2003)
experiment showed that participants exposed to facial expressions displaying negative
emotions showed more constricted attention.
Mendelsohn and Griswold (1967) investigated the effects of repression denial and
anxiety on the use of incidental cues in problem solving. As predicted, high scores in
repression denial were negatively related to the use of incidental cues. Participants with
high repression denial scores used fewer cues than did participants with low repression
denial scores, yet, there was no difference between participants with regards to the raw
number of un-cued solutions. These results were more pronounced for males. Contrary
to expectation, anxiety was related to cue utilization in a curvilinear fashion, again for
males only, with those participants exhibiting the highest and lowest levels of anxiety
using the most cues. A number of key points can be taken from this research. First, it is
clear that different negative emotions affect perceptual attention differently. Second, the
notion that negative emotions uniformly narrow attentional focus is put to question.
Finally, the curvilinear relationship for the effects of anxiety points to the differential
effects of arousal on attention.
Chajut and Algom (2003) also found that stress improved attentional selectivity.
In their study, stress was manipulated by assigning participants high difficulty tasks,
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some of which were unsolvable, imposing time pressure, introducing ego-threat by
stating that they would be able to compare their performance to normative standards, and
by subjecting them to loud noise. Selective attention was assessed by measuring each
participant's ability to filter out irrelevant stimuli in a Stroop task. Narrowing of attention
was uniformly observed across various stress manipulations.
Navon (1977) proposed that under normal circumstances we tend to perceive and
process visual information in a top-down manner, or in his terminology, go from a global
structuring to more-and-more detailed representation of stimuli. In other words, we
dismantle the scene, rather than build it up; we go from global to local features. To test
his hypothesis, Navon used a task in which participants judged clusters of geometrical
figures as being similar or dissimilar to a target cluster. Matching figures based on their
global shape, i.e., cluster shape as a whole, was considered an indication of global bias,
while matching based on component shape, was an indication of local bias. This idea of
broad-narrow, or global-local attention was also used in later research investigating the
effects of mood on attention (e.g., Gasper and Clore, 2002; Fredrickson and Branigan,
2005).
Using Navon's figure task as one of their measures, Gasper and Clore (2002)
investigated the effects of mood on global-local information processing. The results
showed that participants in the negative mood condition were less likely than were the
happy participants to match a figure based on its global features. In another experiment,
participants in a sad mood condition were also less likely than their happy counterparts to
rely on a global concept.
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Similar findings were obtained in Fredrickson and Branigan's (2005) study. In
this study, participants were initially shown either a positive, negative or neutral video
clip. Then, their scope of attention was assessed using Navon's (1977) global-local visual
processing task. The hypothesis that people who experience predominantly positive
emotions will exhibit a broader scope of attention and will identify figures having greater
global resemblance rather than local resemblance to a standard figure was supported:
participants who viewed a positively charged film identified more global selections than
did the participants who viewed a negatively charged film.
Basso, Schefft, Ris, and Dember (1996) investigated the relationship between
personality characteristics, mood, and the breadth of attention. Due to "differences
between sexes in affective experience and neuropsychological performance, only men
were studied" (Basso et al., p. 250). There was no mood manipulation in this study;
participants were administered three questionnaires: a depression inventory, a measure of
subjective well-being, and a life-satisfaction scale. Breadth of attention was measured
using the Kimchi and Palmer local-global judgment task (1982). The results indicated
that positive mood was positively related to global processing, and negatively related to
local processing. Anxiety and depression, on the other hand were positively related to
local processing and negatively to global processing.
Bless, Clore, Schwarz, Golisano, Rabe and Wolk (1996) found that happy
participants relied more on general knowledge structures than did participants in a sad
mood. Mood was induced by either asking participants to write about a happy or sad life
event, or by showing them a positively or negatively charged video. Following mood
induction, participants listened to a story, and were then presented with items that were
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either typical or atypical to the story. They were then asked to indicate whether the items
were present within the story. The dependent variable was the participants' reliance on
either general knowledge, or on the information presented within a story. Happy
participants were more likely to judge a typical item as having been previously presented
in a story than were sad participants, i.e., they relied more on their general knowledge
than on information from within a story. This finding supports the proposition that happy
moods aid on tasks requiring broad attention and top-down information processing.
Hicks and King (2007) investigated whether breadth of attention plays a
mediating or moderating role between mood and meaning in life. While no support was
found for the researchers' hypothesis that scope of attention relates to focus in life, the
researchers did find a positive relationship between positive mood and breadth of
attention, thus, adding further support for the positive mood/scope of attention
relationship.
Gable and Harmon-Jones (2008, 2010) noted the existence of a far more complex
relationship between mood and attentional focus. In the 2008 study, they found evidence
that positive affect high in approach motivation reduced the breadth of attention. The
authors argue that the reason for previous studies finding that positive mood broadens
attentional focus is due to the fact these studies manipulated positive affect low in
approach motivation. In four studies, participants consistently showed less global
attentional focus after they were induced into a positive mood high in approach
motivation. Similar to the results of previous studies, positive mood low in approach
motivation increased global attentional focus. The authors explained these results in
terms of an evolutionary perspective. Positive affect low in approach motivation implies
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stability and comfort, which fosters a broadening of attention for play and exploration.
Conversely, positive affect high in approach motivation implies desired goal pursuit, in
which case, the narrowing of attention serves the function of shutting off irrelevant
stimuli that might distract from achieving the main goal.
In 2010 study, Gable and Harmon-Jones argue, that while negative affect high in
motivational intensity narrows attentional focus, negative affect low in motivational
intensity broadens the attentional span. They suggested the reason previous research
found that negative affect narrows the scope of attention is due to the fact that only
negative affect high in motivational intensity was investigated. In the first experiment of
this study, mood was manipulated by showing participants color photographs that were
meant to evoke either a sad mood (low motivational intensity) or a neutral mood; the
photographs were selected from the International Affective Picture System (Lang,
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005). Scope of attention was measured using Navon's letters task
(1977); the concept of which was similar to Navon's geometrical figure task. Different
from the majority of other research, it was participants' response time, rather than the
number of global-local selections that was used as a dependent measure. The results
showed that reaction time between global and local targets was larger in the sad mood
condition than in the neutral mood condition. Additionally, participants in the sad mood
condition showed a slower response time to local targets, while reaction time to global
targets was similar across all conditions. This was taken as evidence of sad photographs
causing a broadening of attention. In a follow-on experiment, the effects of highmotivation negative affect (disgust) were examined. Mood was manipulated by showing
participants pictures that were collected from the internet and were intended to elicit
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disgust. The dependent measure was identical to the previous experiment. Participants in
the disgust condition responded faster to local targets than to global targets, thus showing
a narrowing of attention. These results show that deactivating negative mood states high
in avoidance (sadness), broaden attention, while activating negative moods high in
avoidance (disgust), narrow attention.
Studies examining the relationship between temperament, affect and attention
found that introversion and extraversion correlated with the manner in which attention
was directed towards positive or negative cues. Derryberry's research (1987) revealed the
phenomenon that introverts pay greater attention to negative cues than do extraverts. In a
consequent research, Derryberry and Reed (1994) reestablished that extraverts were slow
to shift attention away from positive locations, whereas introverts were slow to shift from
negative locations. The researchers also found that negative feedback amplified this
effect. These findings bridge the results of research investigating the effects of shortlasting moods on attention with the findings of more global affective states being
associated with stable personality characteristics.
In sum, there is agreement in literature that people under normal circumstances
and while in a positive mood, will tend to process information in a top-down manner, rely
on general knowledge structures and global concepts, and in short, possess broad
attentional focus. Conversely, people in a negative mood tend to process information in a
bottom-up manner, rely more so on problem relevant information than on general
knowledge, and demonstrate local bias, in other words, show a narrowing of attentional
focus.
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Studies investigating affect associated with personality characteristics also found
a similar relationship between mood and attention. For example, introversion, a trait
usually associated with narrow attentional focus was found to correlate with attention to
negative cues, while extraversion, a trait associated with habitually broad attentional
focus, was found to correlate with attention to positive cues (Derryberry, 1987;
Derryberry & Reed, 1994). It is conceivable, that the narrowing of attention phenomenon
might only be applicable to instances of negative affect high in activation, and not to
negative affect low in activation. Only one study to date showed this particular pattern
(Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010). However, because the study design included only
negative and neutral mood conditions and failed to include a positive mood condition
(thus creating a design that disallows adequate between group comparison), finding of
this study should be interpreted with caution.
Theories of why attentional focus narrows under negative activating mood states
(such as states associated with the "fight or flight" response), hold that attentional
resources are limited, thus selectivity, or localization of attention serves the purpose of
allocating limited resources to the most pressing task-at-hand in the most efficient
manner. Since "survival" of an individual may depend on the solving of a stressor-related
problem, narrowing of attention ensures that resources are not wasted on other tasks
(Chajut & Algom, 2003). Broad attention and the global bias associated with positive and
neutral moods also make sense from an evolutionary perspective. Positive moods elicit
broad attention that facilitates exploration and experimentation (Fredrickson, 2000).
While negative emotions and narrow attention take care of survival and problem solving,
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positive emotions and broadened attention promote play and exploration, facilitating the
growth of an individual.
Attention and Creativity
Attention is linked to creativity in several ways. First, well-known stereotypes
portray creative people as absent minded, paying little attention to mundane issues, with
their attention wandering in some "higher sphere" (N^cka, 1999). While stereotypes
should not be taken as evidence of any sort, they might point to a consistent phenomenon
in some cases. Second, creative scientists report similar changes in their attention during
the creative process. With regards to insight, they describe their attention as "diffused"
just prior to an insight, and as "scanning" once the insight has been achieved (Ghiselin,
Rompel & Taylor, 1964). Last, multiple experimental studies have found evidence of a
relationship between attention and creativity (e.g., N?cka, 1999; Mendelsohn, 1976;
Kasof, 1997). While most researchers agree that a relationship between attention and
creativity exists, the direction of this relationship has less consensus. Some researchers
found that broad attention fosters creativity, while narrow attention impedes it, others
have found an opposite trend, and yet others have found that both broad and narrow
attention fosters creativity, however this relationship is task dependent.
Mednick (1962) proposed that individual differences in the strength distribution
of associative responses are responsible for individual differences in creativity. Mednick
distinguished between individuals with steep and flat associative hierarchies. Individuals
with steep associative hierarchy tend to be restricted to stereotypical responses, i.e.,
responses highest in associative strength. The associative strength of responses to stimuli
for individuals with a flat associative hierarchy is more equally distributed, thus
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increasing the probability of them producing a more remotely associated, and therefore
less stereotypical, response. Mednick proposed that the steeper the hierarchy, the less
likely an individual to acquire a creative solution. It is those that are more likely to
produce less stereotypical responses who are going to be more creative: "It is among
these more remote responses that the requisite elements and mediating terms for a
creative solution will be lurking" (Mednick, 1962, p.223). Individual differences in
associative strength of responses can be viewed as differences in breadth of conceptual
attention (Martindale, 1981, 1995; Friedman, Fishbach, Forster, & Werth, 2003), i.e.,
individuals with a steep associative hierarchy can be described as having a narrow scope
of attention, and individuals with a flat associative hierarchy can be viewed as having a
broad scope of attention. Thus, individuals with a broad scope of attention will tend to
produce the least stereotypical, and therefore, most creative responses.
Mendelsohn (1976) believed that a wide breadth of attention facilitates creative
performance. He noted that "the greater the attention capacity, the more likely the
combinatorial leap which is generally described as the hallmark of creativity" (p.366). He
viewed attention as an important variable in studying creativity, a variable independent of
intelligence. In a series of studies, Mendelson and his colleagues showed that a wide
breadth of attention aided creative performance (Mendelsohn & Griswold, 1967;
Mendelsohn, 1976; Mendelsohn & Lindholm, 1972). Mendelsohn and Griswold's (1967)
study found that anxiety was negatively related to cue utilization, the results, however,
generalized only to males. Repression denial scores were also negatively related to cue
utilization, once again, the relationship was stronger for males. Mendelsohn and
Lindholm's (1972) study showed that breadth of attention affected priming. In
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Mendelsohn's (1976) study, the relationship between attentional capacity and Remote
Associates Test (RAT) scores were examined. The findings supported his proposition
indicating that participants with higher attentional capacity would score higher on the
RAT. The author hypothesized that the results were due to the ability of participants with
high attentional capacity to maintain several search strategies simultaneously. However,
similar to the previous study, this finding generalized only to the male participants.
N^cka (1999) found that creativity was associated with impaired functioning of
the filter of attention. In his study, participants scoring high on divergent thinking
measures had longer reaction time on attention tasks than did participants scoring low on
divergent thinking measures, particularly when task complexity increased. In the
attention task, participants were asked to identify letters identical to the target letter and
ignore all others. Creativity was measured using two tasks: Test for Creative ThinkingDrawing Production (TCT-DP) and Thinking Styles Questionnaire (TSQ). TCT-DP
required participants to complete an unfinished picture. TSQ is a self-report measure
consisting of items measuring ten scales that the author thought to be associated with
creativity: (1) ego strength, (2) flexibility, (3) nonconformity, (4) spontaneity, (5)
tolerance to incongruity, (6) internal locus of control, (7) intrinsic cognitive motivation,
(8) esthetic attitude, (9) originality, and (10) self-actualization. The results showed that
participants who scored higher on the creativity measure had poorer attentional
functioning indices, i.e., had weaker filter of attention than did less creative participants.
N^cka explained the confusing results of selective attention impairment in creative
individuals by noting "the lack of a strong and efficient filter of attention may make a
person susceptible to "irrelevant" stimuli which are normally ignored or suppressed"
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(N^cka, p. 94). In terms of broad/narrow attention, filter of attention, that gives the ability
to filter information, implies narrowing of attention. Thus, participants who had broader
attention had better divergent thinking scores, yet, their ability to filter out irrelevant
stimuli was reduced. The results also showed that creative individuals' performance
deteriorated with time, particularly for individuals who scored high on intrinsic
motivation. These findings mirror the findings of Kaufmann and Vosburg (2002) who
likewise found a deterioration of idea production in participants within the positive mood
condition, a state associated with broader attention.
Kasof (1997) found that breadth of attention was positively correlated with
creative performance. Breadth of attention was assessed by the Stimulus Screening Scale,
which measures "individual differences in the tendencies to automatically filter irrelevant
or extraneous stimuli from awareness and to habituate to salient stimuli (Kasof, p.306)".
Narrowing of attention was induced by exposing the participants to loud noise. Creativity
was assessed by asking participants to write two semi-structured poems. Creativity was
found to correlate positively with breadth of attention. Creative performance was
impaired by noise; in particular, noise impaired the creative performance of participants
with a wide base-line breadth of attention more so than in those participants having a
narrow breadth of attention.
Friedman, Fishbach, Forster, and Werth (2003) found that situationally induced
broad attention was related to better performance on divergent thinking tasks. In their
study, scope of attention was primed by asking participants to conduct a visual search in
either a broad or narrow area of a visual field. Two different tasks were used: one
involved identifying the correct digits on a visual display, and the other asked participants
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to concentrate on either a broad or narrow area of a map. Originality, one of the
components of creativity, was assessed in three ways. The first task required participants
to produce as many creative alternative uses for a brick as possible, the second task asked
participants to create an original title for a photograph, and the third asked participants to
provide the most unusual exemplar to a provided category (e.g., "birds", "colors", etc.).
Results were consistent across all manipulation conditions and all tasks: participants in
the broad attention condition showed greater originality than those participants in the
narrow attention condition. In their final experiment the authors tested the hypothesis of
whether simply manipulating the body muscles associated with broad or narrow
attentional focus would likewise affect creativity in the same manner. They indeed found
that when participants were asked to contract the muscles associated with broad attention
(frontalis muscles), they produced more original uses for a pair of scissors, than did the
participants who were asked to contract muscles associated with narrow attention
(orrugators muscles). Thus, the study showed support for the ease of situational changes
in the scope of attention, and correspondingly, creativity itself.
In a six-month longitudinal study of sports creativity, Memmert (2007) examined
long-term changes in creativity associated with attentional scope. After completion of a
six-month training program, creativity was measured with tactical games that used reallife sports scenarios. These narrow and broad attention programs improved different
aspects of creative sport performance: broad attentional programs improved complex task
performance, while narrow attentional programs improved simple task performance.
In sum, research shows overwhelming support for the connection between the
broad scope of attention and higher divergent thinking scores, particularly when
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measured as the number of divergent ideas produced and the originality of ideas. It was
proposed that creative people have easier access to remote associates in the semantic
network. It was also shown that creative people have impaired filter of attention, which is
responsible for information filtering. However, individuals with broad attentional focus
tire out faster on idea production than do people with narrower attentional focus. While
broad attention training programs improved complex task performance, narrow attention
training improved simple task performance, thus raising the question whether narrow
attention might be beneficial during some stages of the creative process. Finally, there are
no studies to date investigating how other components of creativity are affected by
narrowing of attentional focus, and whether they too might realize a benefit.
Resolving the Controversy: Stage Model of Creativity
Despite the almost rule of law postulate throughout the field of creativity that
positive emotions uniformly and undeniably facilitate creative problem solving
(Kaufman, 2003), a multitude of evidence contradicting this claim has been uncovered.
Not only have negative emotions been found to promote creativity, but evidence suggests
that positive emotions hinder creative processes on some occasions. While historical
research profiling prominent creators have always noted a link between negative
emotions and creativity, little of that notion has found its way into experimental research.
Surprisingly, however, while meta-analyses investigating the link between emotions and
creativity have been only finding positive relationship between positive emotions and
creativity, and no or negative relationship between negative emotions and creativity,
multiple separate studies have, in fact, found that negative emotions can promote
creativity while positive emotions may stifle it. Why then such a discrepancy in research

findings? Two reasons are investigated in this paper are: (1) the mediating effect of
attention on the mood-creativity relationship; and (2) the multidimensional nature of
mood and the creativity constructs, with different dimensions of each having different
correlates (Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Stage model of the relationship between mood, attention and creativity.

There appears to be two ways in which emotions affect creativity, one is through
affecting motivation to engage in a task, and the second, through affecting cognitive
processing, in particular through affecting attentional focus. Creativity, on the other hand,
is a multifaceted, multistage process, with different correlates associated with different
stages, yet, in laboratory studies it is broken down into its basic components. While such
breakdown allows researchers to study creativity experimentally, it does not effectively
reproduce all the interactions which occur in the real-life creative process.
Helmholtz (1896) and Wallas (1926) originally suggested that the creative process
can be divided into the following four stages: preparation, incubation, illumination or
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inspiration, and verification or elaboration. Rathunde (2000) proposed that these four
stages can be more broadly grouped into two stages: preparation and illumination.
Similarly, insight problem research delineates at least two distinct stages in achieving an
insight: the first stage is generative, associated with a search through the mental
representation space, and the second is associated with finding a solution based on a
formed representation (Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992). The first step in the creative
process, during which incubation and preparation occur, is associated with defocused,
broad attention. This stage is characterized by divergent thinking, conceptually driven
processing, a search for novel and unorthodox ideas, and new ways of problem
representation. The second step in the creative process is characterized by focused,
narrow attention and is associated with illumination and verification. This stage is
characterized by data driven information processing and convergent thinking. In the
creative process these two stages alternate in a circular, or more accurately, spiral
manner, as a person works through the problem seeking the most optimal solution. Thus,
while during the first stage of the creative process, positive emotions may aid in
acquiring a broader perspective and an accumulation of information, during the second
stage, negative emotions might be as beneficial in the narrowing of one's attention in
order to achieve higher concentration on the task at hand (Rathunde, 2000).
These two stages work in opposition to one another, going through multiple
iterations during the creative process. Broadening of attention is associated with an
exploration stage, when fresh ideas are brought into awareness, attentional focus is
broadened to encompass new possibilities, remote, and seemingly unrelated ideas; in
short, this stage is most traditionally linked to creativity in most research. During the
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other stage, which is associated with narrowing of attention, new ideas that were brought
to attention during the previous stage are scrutinized and strictly analyzed, unworthy
ideas are discarded, while worthy ideas are retained. If no solution is found, the process
repeats itself until a satisfactory solution is achieved or the individual gives up. It is worth
noting, that these two stages are quite contrasting in terms of their correlates, and many
correlates having a positive relationship with one stage, will have negative relationship
with the other stage. For example, the first stage is associated with a higher number of
ideas produced, while the second stage is associated with better quality of ideas,
originality, and restructuring of mental representations (Kaufmann, 2003a, 2003b;
Vosburg & Kaufmann, 1998). Likewise, analytical data scrutinizing and data-driven
processing are crucial for the second stage, however, these processes would be
detrimental during the first stage, when unusual and unorthodox ideas are important.
More recently, later cognitive models of insight problem solving expanded the
initial two stages proposed by earlier researchers. Ash and Wiley (2006) elaborated on
earlier models of the insight problem solving by adding stages to these models (see
Figure 2). First stage is problem representation, during which the solver forms an initial
problem representation. However, in the case of insight problems, prior experience often
leads to an incorrect representation of a problem, which in turn fails to yield a correct
solution. Next, is the solution phase. As the initial representation was faulty the solver is
unable to solve the problem and arrives at impasse, the point where no further progress is
possible based on the initially formed representation. At this point the solver either gives
up any further attempt to solve the problem, or progresses to the restructuring phase.
During the restructuring phase, the solver revisits the initial representation and makes
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adjustments, thus forming a new representation of the problem. If the new representation
of the problem is correct, the solver successfully solves the problem, if not, the solver
either gives up, or one again moves back into the restructuring phase and repeats the
cycle until the problem is solved.

Success

m
Representation
Phase

Solution Phase

Restructurina

Failure
Failure

Figure 2. The stages of insight problem solving (Ash and Wiley, 2006, p. 69).

As with the two-stage model, certain predictions can be made regarding how
attentional breadth affects different stages of the Ash and Wiley (2006) model of the
insight problem solving process. Broad attention helps during the representation and
restructuring phases by bringing in more divergent and "unlikely" ideas that diverge from
the original, faulty representation. This can be achieved by activating distant nodes in the
semantic network of long-term memory. Narrow attention helps to choose an idea from
the multiple ideas that come up, analyze the idea for its potential usefulness, and work it
to a solution; in other words it helps to zoom in on one potential solution among many.
Without such controlled concentration, even if the right idea presents itself, it may be
discarded prior to being properly analyzed.
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An overview of studies investigating the relationship between emotions, attention
and creativity suggests that looking at emotions as a single positive-negative dimension is
oversimplified, and is not representative of all the complexities within the construct. At
least two dimensions need to be taken into account when investigating emotional
phenomenon with regards to creativity: hedonic tone and arousal. Throughout various
stages of the creative process, these dimensions correlate differently with the creative
performance. The vast majority of studies analyzing the relationship between emotions,
attention and creativity investigate hedonic tone as predictor of creativity. However,
when only positive and negative affect are used as predictors of attention and creativity,
study results often contradict each other. With the added dimension of high and low
arousal, differential predictions appear for different alignments of dimensions. For
example, investigation of the activating/deactivating mood axis showed a broadening of
attention for both positive and negative deactivating moods (Isen & Daubman, 1984).
This differential influence of various mood dimensions on attention allows us to explain
the contradictory findings of mood on creativity. If attention stands as a mediating
variable between mood and creativity, differential effects of mood on attention will in
turn affect differently various components of creativity.
Hypotheses
Positive emotions have been shown to broaden and negative emotions to narrow
attentional focus. However, some research suggests that the effects of mood valence on
different tasks are conditional on activation or arousal. Thus, the prediction is that
mood's effect on attention will interact with arousal.
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Hypothesis 1: Effects of mood on attention will be dependent on activation, i.e.,
there will be an interaction between mood and arousal.
There is well-established research showing a relationship between mood and
creative task performance. However, the direction of this relationship is controversial.
Some research finds that positive mood has a positive influence on creative performance,
while negative mood has a negative influence. Other research suggests just the opposite,
positive mood having a negative relationship with creativity, while negative mood having
a positive relationship with creativity. Based on the multi-stage creativity model, the
prediction is that whether or not mood enhances creativity depends on the type of creative
task, and further, that the relationship between mood and creative task performance will
also be dependent on arousal.
Hypothesis 2: On creative tasks that require broad attention for successful
performance, mood condition associated with broad attention will enhance performance,
while mood condition associated with narrow attention will have a detrimental effect on
performance.
Hypothesis 3: On creative tasks that require narrow attention for their successful
completion, mood associated with narrow attention will have an enhancing effect on
performance, while mood associated with broad attention will be detrimental.
Hypothesis 4: There will be a three-way interaction between mood, arousal, and
problem type.
On insight problems, broad attention will promote a higher solution rate on
problems that require multiple restructurings, while narrow attention will lead to a higher
solution rate on single restructuring problems.

44

Hypothesis 5: Participants in the broad attention condition will solve more two
restructuring problems than will participants in the narrow attention condition.
Hypothesis 6: Participants in the narrow attention condition will solve more one
restructuring problems than will participants in the broad attention condition.
For an outline of the variables, hypotheses and corresponding analyses please see
Table 1.
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Table 1
Summary of Analyses and Associated Variables
Measure

Analyses

Design

Independent Variables

Dependent
Variables

Hypotheses

PANAS

Between
ANOVA

One-Way

Valence (positive,
negative, neutral)

PA, NA

Manipulation
Check

Stroop

Split-plot
ANOVA

2x2x2

Congruency
(congruent,
incongruent), Valence
(positive, negative),
Arousal (high, low)

Reaction time

1

Global
Selections

Between
ANOVA

2x2

Mood (positive,
negative),
Arousal (high, low)

Number of global
selections

Rebus Puzzles

Split-plot
ANOVA

2x2x2

Restructurings (one,
two), Valence
(positive, negative),
Arousal (high, low)

Number of
problems solved

Fluency
(UU &C
Problems)

Split-plot
ANOVA

2x2x2

Problem Type (UU, C),
Valence (positive,
negative),
Arousal (high, low)

Number of ideas

Originality
(UU&C
Problems)

Split-plot
ANOVA

2x2x2

Problem Type(UU, C),
Valence (positive,
negative),
Arousal (high, low)

Originality of
ideas

2,3

Usefulness
(UU&C
Problems)

Split-plot
ANOVA

2x2x2

Problem Type (UU, C),
Valence (positive,
negative),
Arousal (high, low)

Usefulness of
ideas

No prediction

Squares &
Matchsticks

Chi-Square

3x2x2x2

Mood (positive,
negative, neutral),
Arousal (high, low),
Problem type
(matchstick arithmetic,
squares)

Solved/Not Solved

2,3

5,6
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METHOD
Participants
Based on the findings of the previous experiments, power analysis was conducted
to determine the sample size necessary to detect an effect, if such existed. Gable and
Harmon-Jones (2010) reported effect sizes from two experiments, both of which used
photographs selected from the International Affective Picture System (Lang, Bradley, &
Cuthbert, 2005). The experiments investigated the effects of emotional sates on the
breadth of attention. Gable and Harmon-Jones used adapted Navon's (1977) attentional
breadth measure, similar to the measure used in the current experiment. One of these
studies compared how sad picture condition (negative affect low in arousal) versus
neutral condition affects attentional breadth. The associated effect size was tj2 = .12. For
this effect size, using a = .05, and 80% power, as recommended by Cohen (1992), the
necessary number of participants per group is n = 30. Thus, the total number of
participants for the five conditions of this experiment (positive low arousal, positive high
arousal, negative low arousal, negative high arousal, and neutral) had to be at least N =
150.
Two hundred seventy Old Dominion University undergraduate students were
recruited to participate in this study. The participants were required to be at least 18 years
of age in order to participate. The mean age of the participant was M - 20.3, SD = 3.15,
with minimum age of 18 and maximum age of 43 years old. There were 174 females and
96 males in this study. Students signed up for the experiment using the university's
computerized research system, and they received one point of departmental research
credit for their participation. Application for exempt human subject research was

47

submitted to Old Dominion University's Institutional Review Board and was found to be
exempt from IRB review. Ethical guidelines as set forth by the American Psychological
Association were followed, and all participants were required to sign a volunteer rights
notification form.

Positive Mood Low Arousal

Negative Mood Low Arousal

Negative Mood High Arousal

Positive Mood High Arousal

Figure 3. International Affective Picture System samples.
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Materials
In this study, emotions were induced by using the International Affective Picture
System (IAPS). The IAPS has been developed by the National Institute of Mental Health
(NIMH) Center for Emotion and Attention (CSEA) at the University of Florida as a tool
for investigating emotion and attention. The IAPS (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) is a
set of standardized, emotion-inducing color photographs representing a wide range of
semantic categories. The IAPS has three major dimensions of emotion: two of these
primary dimensions are valence of affect (ranging from positive to negative), and arousal
(ranging from calm to aroused). The third is a "dominance" or "control" dimension. (For
examples of IAPS images see Figure 3).
Attention was measured using two instruments: Navon's (1977) global-local
processing task and the Stroop task. Navon's geometrical figure task (Figure 4) uses
global-local visual processing paradigms to measure a predisposition towards broad or
narrow attentional focus. In this task, participants are given a target figure, which they
then compare with two comparison figures. One comparison figure resembles the target
figure in global features, while the other is similar to the target figure in detailed, or local
elements. Matching figures based on their global shape, i.e., cluster shape as a whole, is
considered an indication of global bias, while matching based on component shape, is an
indication of local bias. This task is commonly used in research investigating broad-local
attentional biases (e.g., Gasper and Clore, 2002; Fredrickson and Branigan, 2005). The
Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) is a classic attentional selectivity test. In this task, the names
of colors printed in various colored fonts are presented, and the participant's task is to
identify font color while ignoring the printed word. Herein, there are two types of stimuli:
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congruent and incongruent. The congruent stimuli have matching word meaning and font
color, while the incongruent stimuli have conflicting word meaning and font color. The
difference in reaction time between congruent and incongruent stimuli indicates the
Stroop effect. Stroop effect indicates poor functioning of selective attention, thus shorter
reaction time indicates better selective attention, and should relate to a narrowing of
attentional focus. Conversely, longer reaction time indicates poorer functioning of
selective attention, and should relate to a broader attentional focus.

•
••
• •
• •

••
••

•• •
•• •
• ••

A
A A

Item # 16

•
••
• • •

AAA
AAA
AAA

Item # 13

A A
A A
•
••
• ••

A A
A
A A
AAA

•
• •

Item # 10

•

• AA
AAA
AAA
• ••
• ••
• • •

Item# 18

Item # 24

Item # 19

A A
A A

•
• •

• ••
• ••
• • •

A
A A
AAA

Figure 4. Examples of global-local items.

Creativity was measured using two types of problems: insight problems (problems
with only one correct answer), and open-ended problems (problems having multiple
correct answers or no single answer defined as being "correct"). For both types of
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problems there are two subtypes, each requiring either a broad or narrow attentional
focus.
Insight Problems. Two types of insight problems were used: rebus puzzles and
matchstick problems.
Rebus puzzles (Figure 5) are widely used throughout insight problem research. A
rebus puzzle typically requires the solver to come up with a common phrase based on
verbal or visual cues hidden within the presented material (MacGregor & Cunningham,
2009). For example, the solution to "PUNISHMENT" is capital punishment, which
requires the solver to attend and explicitly interpret the font characteristics of the
presented word. A rebus puzzle may require more than one such restructuring, e.g., to
come up with a solution for "amUous", the solver must first, interpret the capitalized
letter as "big", and second, interpret the (big) letter as being part of the word. Hence,
amUous can be interpreted as ambiguous. As the number of restructurings increase, so
does the difficulty of the puzzle. A puzzle's difficulty also increases as restructuring
moves from the supra-word level (relationship between words) to the sub-word level
(interpretation of the characteristics of the word). Four types of rebus puzzles were used:
sub-word with one restructuring, sub-word with two restructurings, supra-word with one
restructuring, and supra-word with two restructurings. Broad attention should be related
to better solution rates on problems with multiple restructurings, as it will expand the
solver's solution space, and allow a search for more possible answers after initial impasse
is overcome. Alternatively, narrow attention will promote higher solution rates on
problems with one restructuring, as it will promote better focus in relation to a single
impasse.
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Sub-word,
one
restructuring
Sub-word,
two
restructurings
Supra-word,
one
restructuring
Word/supraword, two
restructurings

AGES

R.P.I.

BAD wolf

PUNISHMENT

league

XQQME

H345

amUous

beating

somewhere
rainbow
little
little

LARGE
LARGE

a home

rodiamondugh

beating

J
FRIEND g FRIEND

little little
little

home

beating bush beating

LARGE

T

L
Y
1
N
G

0
r clock c
k

JOB

Figure 5. Rebus puzzles.

Two types of matchstick problems were used: matchstick arithmetic and
geometrical figures. Matchstick arithmetic problems are often used in cognitive research
(Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider, & Rhenius, 1999). These types of problems present a false
arithmetic statement written in Roman numerals. The directions to the problem allow for
the moving of just one matchstick in order to solve the problem. The primary challenge in
these types of problems comes from the difficulty in decomposing chunks of the problem
as perceived by the solver (such as a plus sign or numerals such as X, V, etc.). An
example of such a problem would be:
XI = 111 + 111
In order to solve the problem, the solver has to slide one matchstick in numeral X to
transform it into the numeral V, which provides the solution:
VI = III + III
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Yet another insight problem, the Squares, requires the solver to go beyond the
current problem representation in order to solve. In this problem the solver is given
directions to move three matchsticks to make five squares from the original three.

JlL
UU
The only possible solution is creating four small squares enclosed by a larger square.

CO
LU
The difficulty of this problem lies in recognizing that the larger figure consisting
of four smaller squares creates the fifth square.
Open-Ended Problems. There were two types of open-ended problems used:
problems requiring the production of multiple divergent ideas [Unusual Uses (UU)] and
problems requiring extrapolation from a given situation to a different situation
[Consequences(C)]. Both problem types were adapted from the Minnesota Tests of
Creative Thinking which were developed based on Guilford's and colleagues' materials
(Guilford, Wilson, Christensen, & Lewis, 1951). The Unusual Uses problem is
commonly used as a divergent thinking measure in creativity research assessing fluency
and the originality of ideas (Smith, Michael, & Hocevar, 1990) and is a direct
modification of the Guilford Brick Uses Test. In this type of problem, participants are
instructed to write as many answers to a question as quickly as they can, e.g., "List as
many as possible uses for a shoe".
The Consequences task has been used in research investigating emotions and
attention (e.g., Abele, 1992). The Consequences task measures the logical extrapolation
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of experiences applied to an impossible situation. In this task, participants were instructed
to produce as many ideas as possible for the fictitious situation of "what would happen if
one were able to listen to [another] person's secret thoughts (Abele, p. 207). This task is
also scored for the fluency and originality of ideas.
The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) was used as a manipulation
check measure. PANAS (Appendix A), a twenty-item scale, is a highly reliable and valid
measure of positive and negative affect. Using it, participants indicate, on a 1-5 scale, to
what extend they experience the following twenty emotions: interested, distressed,
excited, upset, strong, guilty, scared, hostile, enthusiastic, proud, irritable, alert, ashamed,
inspired, nervous, determined, attentive, jittery, active, and afraid (Watson, Clark, &
Tellegen, 1988).
Procedure
Each participant registered for the study using the university's computerized
research system. This was an on-site study with the participants attending a one-hour
session at a laboratory located on the Old Dominion University campus. Upon arrival,
each participant was greeted by a researcher. The participants were informed of the
study's purpose and signed a volunteer rights notification form prior to the experiment. A
research assistant then read a welcome script to the participants and provided them with
instructions for the experiment. Participants used a laboratory personal computer (PC) to
complete the experiment. The measures' presentation order was randomized across the
participants. Each participant was debriefed at the end of each session. Experiment
protocol was created using E-Prime experimental programming software.
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Each experiment session started with the participants reading the directions for
the first task. Next, the participants were presented with stimuli blocks: global/local
attention measure, Stroop task, rebus puzzles, matchstick problems, and Unusual Uses
and Consequences open-ended problems. Stimuli blocks' order of presentation was
randomized across the participants. Each block was preceded by a set of directions,
followed by two practice trials. For the global/local attention measure, Stroop task, and
rebus puzzles, participants were presented with an emotion-eliciting picture for six
seconds before each trial. Thus, participants were being continuously induced with
emotion-eliciting pictures throughout trials. For the tasks that required longer time for
their completion, such as matchsticks problems (4 min.) and open-ended problems (2
min.), participants viewed a block of emotion-eliciting pictures for 30 seconds prior to
each task. Presentation of pictures was randomized across trials and tasks, thus each
participant within the same emotion/arousal condition viewed pictures in the different
order. After completing all the blocks, the participants were asked to complete the
PANAS scale, as a manipulation check. At the end, all participants viewed six minutes of
low arousal positive pictures and were debriefed by the researcher to ensure that any
possible effects of negative induction did not linger.
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RESULTS
For a summary of analyses performed and associated variables please see Table 1.

Manipulation Check. The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) was
used as a manipulation check measure.
Positive Affect. The between-subject ANOVA for positive affect (PA) scores
showed a significant difference between three conditions (positive, negative and neutral),
F (2, 269) = 21.59, p < .001, partial rj2 = .138. Post-doc comparisons using Sheffe's
Alpha correction showed a significant difference between negative and neutral
conditions, 95% CI [.86,6.13],/? < .01; negative and positive conditions, 95% CI [-6.03,
-1.20],/? < .01; and between neutral and positive conditions, 95% CI [.03, 5.11],/? < .05.
Negative Affect. The between-subject ANOVA for negative affect (NA) scores
showed there was a significant difference between three conditions (positive, negative
and neutral), F(2, 267) = 7.20,/? < .001, partial rj2 = .051. Post-doc comparisons using
Sheffe's Alpha correction showed that there was a significant difference between positive
and negative conditions, 95% CI [.45, 4.26], p < .01; and negative and neutral conditions,
95% CI [-6.13, -.86],/? < .01. No significant difference was detected between neutral and
positive conditions, 95% CI [-3.74, 1.45], p = .56. For the summary of means and
standard errors for positive and negative affect, please see Table 2.
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Table 2
Means and Standard Errors for Positive and Negative Affect
NA

PA
Positive

M
31.47

SE
0.65

M
14.58

SE
0.53

Negative

25.28

0.69

16.93

0.56

Neutral

28.90

1.12

13.44

0.91

Stroop Task. Hypothesis 1 predicted that effects of mood on attention would be
dependent on activation that is that there would be an interaction between mood and
arousal. To test this hypothesis a 2(mood) x 2(arousal) x 2 (congruency) split-plot
ANOVA was conducted on mean reaction time scores. Data were cleaned by bringing in
the outliers to the closest non-outlier value, a technique called "winsorizing" (Duan,
1 9 9 9 ) . T h e r e w a s a m a i n e f f e c t f o r c o n g r u e n c y , F ( 1 , 2 3 4 ) = 3 2 5 . 3 0 , p < . 0 0 1 , p a r t i a l r j 3=
.582, with the incongruent condition taking longer to respond than the congruent
condition. There was also a congruency by valence by arousal interaction, F (1, 234) =
4.10,p< .05, partial rj2 = .017. A follow-up 2-way interaction for the congruent condition
was non-significant, F{ 1, 234) = .11, p = .381, partial rf = .003, while there was a main
effect for valence, F (1, 234) = 6.01, p < .05, partial rf- .025, with the negative condition
(M= 1032.50, SE - 19.41) taking longer to respond than the positive condition (M =
966.87, SE = 18.45). Follow-up two-way interaction for the incongruent condition was
marginally significant, F( 1, 234) = 2.86,p = .09, partial if - .012 (Figure 6).
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Figure 6. Mean reaction time (milliseconds) for the Stroop task as a function of valence,
arousal, and congruency.

Comparison of positive high to positive low was significant, F(l, 234) = 4.12, p
< .05, partial r\2 = .017, with positive high taking longer to respond than positive low.
Comparison of positive low to negative low was also significant, F (1, 234) = 4.96, p <
.05 partial rj2 = .021, with the negative low condition being slower to respond than the
positive low condition. There was also a main between-subject effect for valence, F(1,
234) = 3.73, p < .05, partial t]2= .016, with the negative condition (M= 1088.50, SE =
17.93) taking longer to respond in both congruent and incongruent conditions than the
positive condition (M= 1040.73, SE = 17.04). Cohen's ds were also computed to
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compare between congruent and incongruent conditions for each combination of
mood/arousal induction condition (Figure 6). For the summary of means and standard
errors for reaction time, please see Table 3.

Table 3
Means and Standard Errors for Reaction Times (milliseconds) on Stroop Task
Incongruent

Congruent
M

SE

M

SE

PL

942.41

24.82

1076.01

26.61

PH

986.37

23.85

1155.13

25.57

NL

1018.79

25.03

1161.18

26.84

NH

1030.84

26.17

1143.20

28.05

Total

995.35

13.39

1133.88

12.49

As expected, Stroop effect was observed; participant response time increased
when font color differed from word meaning over that when font color and word meaning
were the same. Overall, in both font color and word meaning matching and non-matching
conditions, participants in a negative mood condition took longer to respond than did
participants in a positive mood condition. More interestingly, there was a different
response pattern observed for congruent and incongruent conditions. When font color and
word meaning matched, participants in a negative mood condition took longer to respond
than did participants in a positive mood condition. When font color and word meaning
did not match, participants in a positive mood high arousal and negative mood low
arousal conditions took longer to respond than did participants in a positive mood low
arousal condition.
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Number of Global Responses. Hypothesis 1 predicted that effects of mood on
attention would be dependent on activation that is that there would be an interaction
between mood and arousal. Leven's test for homogeneity of variance for the number of
global responses was significant, F (3, 184) = 3.29, p < .05. Checking for the skewness
indicated that skewness was within normal range (.20). Also, no outliers were detected
for the number of global responses variable. To correct for the violation of homogeneity
of variance, the data was transformed using logarithmic transformation as recommended
by Maxwell and Delaney (2004, p. 117). After this transformation, Leven's test was non
significant, F(3, 184) = 2.29, p >.05. A 2 (valence) x 2 (arousal) between-subjects
ANOVA for the log-transformed number of global responses detected a valence by
arousal interaction, F( 1, 184) = 9.21, p < .001, partial tj2 = .048 (Figure 7). Contrast
comparing positive low to negative low showed a significant difference between the two
conditions, F(l, 184) = 5.37,p < .05, partial rj2 = .028. Comparison between positive
high and negative high showed a significant difference between the two conditions, F (1,
184) = 3.96, p < .05, partial t]2 — .021. Comparison between a combined positive low and
negative high to a combined positive high and negative low was significant, F(l, 184) =
9.21, p < .01, partial rj2 = .048. For the summary of means and standard errors please see
Table 4.
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Figure 7. Mean number of global selections as a function of valence and arousal.

Table 4
Means and Standard Errors for Number of Global Selections
M

SE

PL

29.78

2.71

PH

21.62

2.67

NL

20.78

2.82

NH

29.79

3.13

These results confirmed the hypothesis that valence and arousal interact in
influencing attentional breadth. Participants' attention in the positive emotion low arousal
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and negative emotion high arousal condition was broader than that in the positive high
and negative low conditions.

6

Arousal

Positive

Negative

Valence

Figure 8. Mean number of solutions for one restructuring Rebus puzzles as
a function of valence and arousal.

Rebus Puzzles. Hypothesis 5 predicted that participants in the broad attention
condition will solve more two restructuring problems than will participants in the narrow
attention condition. Hypothesis 6 predicted that participants in the narrow attention
condition will solve more one restructuring problems than will participants in the broad
attention condition.
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A 2 (number of restructurings: 1 vs. 2) x 2(valence) x 2 (arousal) split-plot
ANOVA was conducted for the number of problems solved. There was a main effect for
the number of restructurings; more one restructuring problems were solved than were two
restructuring problems, F( 1, 231) — 477.52, p < .001, partial r\2 = .674. There was also a
number of restructurings by valence by arousal interaction, F( 1,231)= 16.08, p < .001,
partial tj2 = .065 (Figures 8 & 9).

2 500

3 330

5 130

Arousal

Positive

Negative

Valence

Figure 9. Mean number of solutions for two restructuring Rebus puzzles as
a function of valence and arousal.

The three-way interaction was followed up with two way valence by arousal
interactions for one and two restructurings. Interaction for one restructuring was
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significant, F (1, 231) = 4.32, p < .05, partial r j 2 = .018. Interaction for two restructurings
was also significant, F (1, 232) = 3.89, p < .05, partial rj2 = .016. Follow up comparison
for one restructuring problems comparing positive high and negative low combined (M =
5.21 ,SE = .22) to negative high and positive low combined (M= 4.74, SE = .23) was
significant, F(l, 231) = 4.32, p < .05, partial tj2 = .018. A comparison of low positive to
low negative conditions was marginally significant, F(l, 231) = 2.9,p = .09, partial tj2 =
.012. Follow up comparison for two restructuring problems comparing positive high and
negative low combined (A/= 2.55, SE - .19) to negative high and positive low combined
(M= 2.92, SE = .19) was significant, F(l, 232) = 3.89,p < .05, partial tj2= .016. For the
summary of means and standard errors please see Table 5.

Table 5
Means and Standard Errors for Number of Rebus Puzzles Solved
One Restructuring

Two Restructuring

M

SE

M

SE

PL

4.71

.25

2.95

.18

PH

5.16

.22

2.57

.19

NL

5.25

.22

2.53

.19

NH

4.76

.23

2.86

.20

Total

4.98

.23

2.72

.19

In summary, one restructuring problems were easier to solve than were two
restructuring problems. Additionally, participants in the positive high and negative low
conditions, conditions associated with more local attention, solved more one restructuring
problems than did participants in the negative high and positive low conditions, condition
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linked to more global attention. The pattern was reversed for the two restructuring
problems, participants in the negative high and positive low condition, which is
associated with more global attention, solved more two restructuring puzzles than did
participant in the negative low and positive high condition, a condition associated with
more local attention.

Fluency of Ideas for Unusual Uses (UU) and Consequences (C) Problems.
Hypothesis 4 predicted that there would be a three-way interaction between mood,
arousal, and problem type. The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) between two
coders for the number of ideas produced was .99 for both types of problems (UU and C).
A 2 (problem type) x 2(valence) x 2 (arousal) split-plot ANOVA was conducted for the
number of ideas produced for Unusual Uses (UU) and Consequences (C) problems.
There was a within-subjects main effect for problem type, with participants producing
significantly more ideas for UU problem (M = 6.81, SE = .20), than for C problem (M =
2.41, SE - .09), F (1, 229) = 449.21, p < .001, partial if = .662. There was also a valence
by arousal between-subject interaction, F (1, 229) = 7.15,/? < .01, partial r/3 = .030
(Figures 10 & 11). Follow-up comparisons showed that there was a significant difference
comparing negative high and positive low combined (M = 4.92, SE = .24) to positive high
and negative low combined (M= 4.29, SE = .23) collapsing across both types of
problems, F{ 1, 229) = 7.15,/? < .01, partial t]2 = .030. There was also significant
difference between negative low (M= 4.08, SE - .24) and negative high (M = 4.97, SE =
.25), F(l, 229) = 6.74,/? < .01, partial rf = .029, and positive low (M = 4.87, SE= .24)
and negative low (M = 4.08, SE= .24), F(l, 229) = 5.60,/? < .05, partial tj2= .024, also
collapsing across both types of problems.
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Figure 10. Mean number of ideas produced for Unusual Uses (UU) problem as
a function of valence and arousal.
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Figure 11. Mean number of ideas produced for Consequences (C) problem as
a function of valence and arousal.

In summary, participants with broader attention (negative high arousal and
positive low arousal) showed higher fluency than did participants with narrow attention
(negative low arousal and positive high arousal).
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Originality for Unusual Uses (UU) and Consequences (C) Problems. Analysis
of originality of ideas was performed to test hypotheses 2 and 3. Hypothesis 2 predicted
that on creative tasks that require broad attention for successful performance, mood
condition associated with broad attention would enhance performance, while mood
condition associated with narrow attention would have a detrimental effect on
performance. Also hypothesis 3 predicted that on creative tasks that require narrow
attention for their successful completion, mood associated with narrow attention would
have an enhancing effect on performance, while mood associated with broad attention
would be detrimental.
The ICC between two coders was 0.75 for the Unusual Uses (UU) problem and
0.84 for the Consequences (C) problem. Coding responses were verified by a third coder,
and the coding responses of the initial two coders were averaged for analyses. The task of
the third coder was to make sure that there were no major discrepancies between the
initial two coders. A 2 (problem type) x 2 (valence) x 2 (arousal) split-plot ANOVA was
conducted for the originality of ideas produced for the UU and C problems. There was a
main effect for problem type, F (1, 225) = 252.02, p < .001, partial tj2 = .528, with C
problem responses being rated as significantly more original than UU problem responses.
Additionally, there was a problem type by valence by arousal interaction, F (1, 225) =
9.12,/? < .05, partial

.039 (Figures 12 & 13). Three-way interaction effect was

followed-up with a two-way interaction analyses for each problem separately. Two-way
interaction for the UU problem was marginally significant, F (1,231) = 2.91,/? = .09,
partial rj2 = .012. The comparison between positive low versus negative low was
marginally significant, F(1,231) = 2.85,/? = .09, partial rj2= .012, with positive low
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being rated as more original than negative low. Comparison of positive high and positive
low was also marginally significant, F (1, 231) = 3.07, p - .08, partial rj2 = .01, with
positive low being rated as significantly more original than positive high.

4 700

4 600

Arousal

Positive

Negative

Valence

Figure 12. Mean originality ratings for the Unusual Uses (UU) problem as
a function of valence and arousal.

Two-way interaction for the C problem was significant, F{ 1, 225) = 9.97, p < .01,
partial rj2 = .030. The comparison between positive high and negative high condition was
significant, F (1, 225) = 4.02, p < .05, partial r\2 =.018, with positive high rated as more
original than negative high. The comparison between positive low and negative low was
marginally significant, F(l, 225) = 2.99,p =.08, partial r\2 = .013, with negative low
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rated higher than the positive low condition. The comparison between positive high and
low was marginally significant, F( 1, 225) = 3.16,/? =.08, partial t\2~ .014, with positive
high rated higher than the positive low condition. For the summary of means and
standard errors please see Table 6.
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Figure 13. Mean originality ratings for the Consequences problem as
a function of valence and arousal.

In short, problem type, mood, and arousal interacted in determining how original
the responses were. For Unusual Uses problem, the most original answers were given in
the positive low and negative high conditions, which were associated with broad
attention. For the Consequences problem, the most original responses were those
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produced in conditions associated with narrow attentional breadth (positive high and
negative low).

Table 6
Means and Standard Errors for Originality of Ideas for Unusual Uses and
Consequences Problems
Unusual Uses

Consequences

M

SE

M

SE

PL

4.51

.11

5.52

.12

PH

4.23

.11

5.82

.12

NL

4.24

.12

5.83

.13

NH

4.35

.12

5.48

.12

Total

4.34

.12

5.67

.12

Usefulness of Ideas for Unusual Uses (UU) and Consequences (C) Problems.
The ICC between two coders for the UU problem was 0.71 and 0.76 for the C problem.
Coding responses were verified by a third coder, and the coding responses of the initial
two coders were averaged for analyses. A 2 (problem type) x 2 (valence) x 2 (arousal)
split-plot ANOVA was conducted for the usefulness of ideas produced for UU and C
problems. There was main effect for problem type, F(l, 225) = 6.97,p < .01, partial r\2 =
.030, with the C problem being rated as having significantly higher usefulness of
responses (M = 5.35, SE = .16) than was the UU problem (M= 5.15, SE = .06). There
was also a problem type by valence interaction, F (1, 225) = 9.56, p < .01, partial r\2 =
.041, and problem type by arousal (marginal) interaction, F (1, 225) = 2.66, p < .10,
partial rj2r=i .012 (Figures 14 & 15).
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Figure 14. Mean usefulness ratings for the Unusual Uses (UU) problem as
a function of valence and arousal.

Bonferroni adjustment was made for the follow up comparisons, alpha level of .05
was divided by the number of comparisons, thus leading to a new alpha level of .01. A
follow-up comparison between the positive (M= 5.19, SE = .06) and negative (A/= 5.11,
SE = .06) conditions for the UU problem was non-significant, F(l, 231) = 1.02,p = .315,
partial tj- = .004. Comparison between the C problem positive and negative condition was
significant, F(l, 225) = 7.01,/? < .01, partial rj2 - .030, with the negative condition (M =
5.57, SE = .12) rated as having higher usefulness than the positive condition (A/ = 5.15,
SE =.11). Comparison between low and high arousal condition for the UU problem was
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non-significant, F (1,231) = .49, p = .49, partial t]2 = .002. Further, comparison between
low and high arousal condition for the C problem was non-significant with alpha level
correction, F(l, 225) = 3.95,p < .05, partial //'= .017.
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Figure 15. Mean usefulness ratings for the Consequences problem as
a function of valence and arousal.

There was also between-subject main effects for valence, averaging across both
types of problems, F(l, 225) = 3.72, p < .05, partial rj2 = .016, with negative condition
responses (M- 5.34, SE = .07) being rated as having higher usefulness than positive
condition responses (M =5.17, SE =.06); and main effect for arousal, averaging across
both problems, F (1, 225) = 4.26, p < .05, partial t]2 =.019, with the high arousal
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condition (M - 5.35, SE = .06) having higher usefulness responses than the low arousal
condition (M= 5.16, SE = .06). Problem type by valence by arousal interaction failed to
reach significance.
Overall, Consequences problem was rated as having higher usefulness of
responses than was the Unusual Uses problem. Consequences task results indicated that a
negative mood condition produced responses that were rated as significantly more useful
than responses in the positive mood condition. For the Unusual Uses task there was a
trend of positive mood condition responses being rated slightly higher than negative
mood responses, however, this effect failed to reach significance. High arousal condition
responses were rated overall as significantly more useful than were low arousal
responses.

Square and Matchstick Arithmetic Problems. Analysis of matchstick problems
pertained to hypotheses 2 and 3. Hypothesis 2 predicted that on creative tasks that require
broad attention for successful performance, mood condition associated with broad
attention would enhance performance, while mood condition associated with narrow
attention would have a detrimental effect on performance. Hypothesis 3 predicted that on
creative tasks that require narrow attention for their successful completion, mood
associated with narrow attention would have an enhancing effect on performance, while
mood associated with broad attention would be detrimental.
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Table 7
Percent Solved for Squares and Matchsticks Problems
Percent Solved
Squares

Matchsticks

PL

19

25

PH

22

22

NL

25

24

NH

17

18

A 2 (valance) x 2 (arousal) logistic regression analyses were performed for the
Matchstick Arithmetic and Squares problems. None of the effects of mood or arousal for
these problems were significant. For the Matchstick Arithmetic problem the results of the
tests were: main effect of valence x2 (1)= -03, p = .87; main effect of arousal
p = .34; and valence by arousal interaction

(1) = .91,

(1) = .01 ,p = .98. For the Squares problem

the results of the tests were: main effect of valence/^(l) = .18,/? = .67; main effect of
arousal x2 0) = -25, p = .62; and valence by arousal interaction x2 (1) = -95, p = .33. For
the summary of problems solved please see Table 7.

74

DISCUSSION
Stage model of creativity predicted that effects of mood on attention would be
dependent on activation. Global/local selections and Stroop tasks were hypothesized to be
parallel measures of the breadth of attention, and were used to test these hypotheses. The
results of the global/local task supported the predictions, while Stroop task did not yield
the expected results. Stage model also predicted that type of the task would play a role in
determining mood effects on creativity. In particular, the model predicted that on creative
tasks that require broad attention, mood condition associated with broad attention will
enhance performance, while mood condition associated with narrow attention will have a
detrimental effect on performance. Furthermore, on creative tasks that require narrow
attention, mood associated with narrow attention will have an enhancing effect on
performance, while mood associated with broad attention will be detrimental. To test
these predictions, the study used three types of tasks: rebus puzzles, open-ended
problems, and insight matchstick problems. The results of the rebus puzzles supported the
predictions. Fluency and originality measures of the open-ended problems also supported
the model, while usefulness measure did not. The results of the insight problems did not
support the predictions, either. Finally, manipulation check worked; participants in the
positive mood condition reported feeling more positively than participants in two other
conditions. Furthermore, participants in the negative mood condition reported feeling
more negatively than participants in other conditions.

Stoop Task. Stroop task results did not confirm the expectation that Stroop task
would be an alternative measure of attentional breadth. Whereas some previous studies
associated Stroop effect to attentional breadth (e.g., Chajut & Algom, 2003), this study
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did not find support for such relation. While Stroop task is a widely used classic
selectivity measure in psychological research, questions regarding Stroop effect's
underlying mechanisms continue to receive investigative scrutiny. Originally, Stroop
effect was explained by interference (competition between color and word meaning
within incongruent trials) and facilitation (convergence of color and word meaning within
congruent trials), which were assumed to be two sides of the same coin (e.g., Stroop,
1935), and were traditionally used as a measure of selectivity of attention (MacLeod,
1991). Based on this original view, global/local tasks such as Navon's letters or
geometrical figures' task (Navon, 1977) can be viewed as being analogous to the Stroop
task (MacLeod, 1991). Later investigations broadened the understanding of the Stroop
effect by arguing that interference and facilitation were, in fact, two distinct mechanisms
(MacLeod, 1998; MacLeod & MacDonald, 2000; Kane & Engle, 2003). Kane and Engle
(2003) go on to argue that goal maintenance and competition resolution jointly determine
Stroop task performance, while working memory (WM) capacity and a context-induced
task set will determine which one of the two mechanisms will dominate. Individuals with
high WM-span showed less interference than did low WM-span individuals across all
variations of congruent/incongruent trials. Low-span individuals, on the other hand,
committed more errors than did high-span individuals on rare incongruent trials,
embedded within multiple congruent trials, thus displaying a deficient competitionresolution mechanism. Based on this latter view, the Stroop task might be considered a
poor measure of attentional breadth, which could explain the lack of correlation between
the Stroop task findings and the global/local tasks findings within this study.
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Global/Local Attention. The hypothesis that valence and arousal will interact in
influencing the breadth of attention was confirmed. Positive emotions low on activation
caused broadening of attention, which was consistent with the generally accepted view in
the literature that positive emotions cause a broadening of attention (e.g., Gasper & Clore,
2002; Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005). On the other hand, highly arousing positive
emotions caused a narrowing of attention within this study. This finding was consistent
with more recent research on mood and attention (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008)
showing that positive mood high in approach motivation narrows attentional focus. Gable
and Harmon-Jones suggested that the reason previous studies found that positive mood
broadens attention is due to the fact that low activation positive mood induction was used
within those earlier studies. In fact, review of the methodologies used by previous studies
strongly supports such a view.
In this study, negative mood low on arousal was found to narrow attentional
breadth, a finding consistent with the majority of previous research (e.g., Baron, Moore &
Sanders, 1978; Gasper & Clore, 2002; Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005). Finding that
negative mood low on arousal, a mood commonly associated with sadness and
depression, narrows attentional breadth is also consistent with the analytical rumination
hypothesis. Rumination hypothesis (Andrews & Thomson, 2009) suggests that sad and
depressed people ruminate over their problems, thus narrowing their focus on problems
for which they seek solution, and shutting off all other distractions. In evolutionary terms
such a tactic is highly adaptive, since problem solving is an effortful activity requiring a
great deal of cognitive resources; thus narrowing one's attention on a problem while
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minimizing or ignoring everything else would help to use limited resources more
effectively.
On the other hand, highly arousing negative mood was found to broaden attention.
This finding was completely new in light of previous research. Similar to previous
research on positive emotions, it is conceivable that earlier studies used mood induction
materials that were considerably lower on arousal than the manipulation materials used in
this study. The current study used images in the highly arousing negative condition
picked from the IAPS set of standardized pictures (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008),
that were exceptionally graphic in content and were rated as having extremely high
arousal rating (M = 6.8 on a 1 to 9 scale). Also, a large body of the previous research
used such induction materials as video clips and stories (for review, see Davis, 2009;
Baas, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008), which have significant time delay between the
administration of the material and the dependent measure taken. During this lapse of
time, transitory effects of arousal may dissipate, thus even when using measures that
were thought to be highly activating, they may not have had the intended effect, or that
effect may not have been accurately measured. Recently, however, with the rise of more
sophisticated experimental software, well validated materials have been developed, such
as the imagery used in this study that allowed for minimal time lapse, measured in the
milliseconds, between picture presentation and the dependent measure of interest.
One study of interest is Gable and Harmon-Jones's study (2010) asserting that
negative affect high in motivational intensity narrows attentional focus, while negative
affect low in motivational intensity broadens the attentional span; results that contradict
our findings. While the above study used similar materials, such as IAPS pictures and the
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Navon's letter task (1977), the latter being conceptually similar to the global/local figure
task used by this study, the choice of their dependent variables is quite surprising. Instead
of using a number of global/local selections, the authors instead chose to use reaction
time to make selections, a choice that was motivated by the findings of their own
previous study, and a choice even more oddly taken considering that no number of
global/local selections, the traditional measure used for this type of task, were reported.
The authors used slower reaction time to local targets as an indicator of a broadening of
attention, and faster reaction time as evidence of a narrowing of attention; however, they
do not expound a rationale for its use nor provide a theoretical explanation for it.
The broadening of attention caused by a highly arousing negative emotional state
makes sense from an evolutionary perspective; when faced with a potential "fight-orflight" situation caused perhaps by the sight of a predator, or potential foe, taking-in the
entire picture all at once can be viewed as evolutionary adaptive, as it would aid in
survival. Such a state of total awareness is known as zanshin in the martial arts (Morris,
1992). Zanshin refers to having an awareness of one's surroundings, enemies, their
weapons, and their next possible action all at the same time, while maintaining a state of
alertness that enables quick reaction. Being in a state of broadened attention while being
sufficiently aroused for quick response appears to relate to the zanshin concept.

Rebus Puzzles. All else being equal, one restructuring problems were easier to
solve than were two restructuring problems. This finding supported previous findings by
MacGregor and Cunningham (2008, 2009), and Knoblich et al.'s (1999) prediction that
problems containing more constraints would be more difficult to solve than problems
having fewer constraints. Furthermore, participants in the positive high and negative low
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conditions, conditions associated with narrow attentional breadth, solved more one
restructuring problems than did participants in the negative high and positive low
conditions, which are associated with broad attention. The pattern was reversed for the
two restructuring problems, participants in the negative high and positive low condition,
which is associated with broad attention, solved more two restructuring puzzles than did
participant in the negative low and positive high condition, a condition associated with
narrow attention (Figures 9 &10). Thus, for one restructuring problems, narrow attention
led to more solutions, while for the two restructuring problems, broad attention facilitated
a better solution rate, which supported the hypothesis of differential attentional breadth
requirements during different stages of the creative process. The study's pattern of
findings supports the idea that broad attention is related to the initial exploratory stage of
the creative process, a time when multiple ideas are being considered as candidates for
further exploration; while narrow attention is associated with the later stage of the
creative process, a time when ideas receive greater attention and scrutiny, and are thus
analyzed more closely.

Fluency of Ideas for Unusual Uses (UU) and Consequences (C) Problems.
Ideational fluency is a creativity measure originally developed by Guilford et al. (1951)
that represents the number of ideas produced in response to a certain task. In this study,
participants were asked to write down as many as possible uses for a shoe, and
extrapolate what would happen if one were able to listen to [another] person's secret
thoughts. If the hypothesis about differential attentional breadth requirements during
different stages of the creative process is true, and if fluency of ideas is associated with
the exploratory stage of the creative process, then broad attention should be related to
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more ideas being produced. This relationship should not be dependent on a task, as broad
attention should always be related to better fluency. This in fact, was the exact pattern of
results in this study: participants with broader attention (negative high arousal and
positive low arousal) showed higher fluency than did participants with narrow attention
(negative low arousal and positive high arousal).

Originality for Unusual Uses (UU) and Consequences (C) Problems.
Originality may be considered the truest measure of creativity, as it represents how
divergent ideas are. Amassing multiple ideas, or a fluency of ideas, might well be a
prerequisite for creativity, but, should those ideas be too commonplace, then the
responses cannot be judged as being creative (Torrence, 1962). For example, when asked
to list as many as possible uses for a shoe, one can answer with "walking", "running",
"protect feet", "buy", "gift", etc. However, those categories are hardly considered
original. On the other hand, someone may singularly answer with "door stop," or "hide
candy" which could be judged as being a much more original, or creative answer. As
such, originality may indeed be considered as the most sensitive measure of creativity.
The results showed that task type, mood, and arousal collectively interacted in
determining how original the responses were. For Unusual Uses problem, the problem
type that was thought to simulate the early stages of the creative process, such as
exploration, the most original answers were given in the positive low and negative high
conditions, conditions associated with broad attention. According to the differential
attentional breadth requirement hypothesis, this is the expected pattern if the hypothesis
were true. The current study's findings support those findings of previous studies of
mood effects on creativity for the low arousal condition, i.e., findings that responses were
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judged as being more creative for these problem types in the positive mood condition
(broad attention) as compared to the negative mood condition (narrow attention), (Abele,
1992; Baas, de Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008). Within this study there was an opposite trend for
the high arousal condition; wherein negative high arousal condition responses (the
condition corresponding to broad attention) were judged as having greater originality
than positive high condition responses (the condition associated with narrow attentional
breadth). Thus, conditions related to broad attention were likewise related to a greater
originality of response than those conditions associated with more narrow attention on the
problem representing earlier stage of the creative process.
Conversely, responses for the Consequences problem, the problem that was used
to simulate the later stages of the creative process, showed an exact opposite pattern. The
most original responses were those produced in conditions associated with narrow
attentional breadth (positive high and negative low), as compared to conditions associated
with broader attention (positive low and negative high). This, again, supported the
differential attentional breadth requirement for the different stages of the creativity
hypothesis. These findings help explain the contradictions of earlier studies, i.e., not only
do mood and arousal interact in influencing creativity, but just as importantly it is the
breadth of attention that ultimately predicts its quality .

Usefulness for Unusual Uses (UU) and Consequences (C) Problems. While not
part of the commonly used creativity measures in and of itself (Torrence, 1962), the
inclusion of the usefulness measure in this study was motivated by the very definition of
creative ideas, i.e., that in order to be creative, ideas must not only be novel, but also
potentially useful (Baas et al., 2008). Since usefulness has been traditionally studied only
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as part of the quality component of creativity encompassing both originality and
usefulness (Vosburg, 1998b), there were no predictions developed with regards to this
measure.
Consequences task results indicated that a negative mood condition produced
responses that were rated as significantly more useful than responses in the positive mood
condition: this was not the case for the Unusual Uses task. For the Unusual Uses task
there was a trend of positive mood condition responses being rated slightly higher than
negative mood responses, however, this effect failed to reach significance. These results
are consistent with previous research reporting better overall performance on the Unusual
Uses task under a positive mood condition, and better performance on the Consequences
problem under a negative mood condition (Abele, 1992). High arousal condition
responses were rated overall as significantly more useful than were low arousal
responses.
There are two ways to hypothesize mood's influence on performance: though
changing how we process information, and through motivation (Kaufmann, 2003). The
pattern observed with regards to usefulness ratings suggests that usefulness may not be
influenced so much by attentional breadth, as it may be by motivation. The motivating
effects of negative mood are well documented in the literature (e.g., Akinola & Mendes,
2008; Andrews & Thomson, 2009; Kaufmann, 2003).

Square and Matchstick Arithmetic Problems. While based on theoretical
predictions, it was expected that attentional breadth would influence performance on
these types of insight problems, yet no significant difference was detected. One possible
reason for failing to detect a difference might be due to the fact that a one problem per
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condition approach is not a sensitive enough measure. Moreover, when compared to other
tasks, the Square and Matchstick Arithmetic task had the longest allocated solving time
(4 minutes), a long enough time to allow the transitory effects of emotions and arousal to
dissipate. Another reason why performance on these problems was not affected as much
by our manipulation is that these insight problems might be not as pure in terms of
separation into different stages as other problems used in this research. While solving
these insight problems, performer goes through the search and restructuring phases
multiple times, thus it is difficult to parse out different stages predicted by the stage
creativity model in these problems.

General Discussion. This research was aimed at clarifying the role of attention in
the relationship between emotions and creativity. Stage model predicting that attention
plays a mediating role in this relationship was well supported. While there is research
investigating how emotions affect creativity, there has been no research to date
examining attention as a mediating variable in the emotions/creativity relationship. This
research was the first step to empirically investigate the relationship among emotions,
attention and creativity simultaneously. New methods were introduced to answer
questions regarding this triadic relationship. Differing from previous creativity research
that did not differentiate among creativity outcome measures based on attentional breadth
requirements, this study used creativity measures that were attention-specific, i.e., tasks
that require either broad or narrow attention for their completion.
The stage model of creativity that this research proposed was well supported: both
positive and negative emotions were shown to differentially facilitate different stages of
the creative process. The finding that positive emotions promote creativity is not new, a
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number of previous studies reported similar findings as well. However, other research
found that at times negative emotions fostered creativity and positive emotions stifled it,
and this was not easy to explain using the traditional theories of how emotions influence
creativity. The most widely accepted explanation for positive emotions promoting
creativity is the spreading activation model that suggests that greater creativity is
exhibited under a positive mood condition when more distant nodes are activated within a
network, and more divergent ideas are produced (Isen & colleagues, 1984, 1985, 1987).
However, the spreading activation model fails to explain why under some circumstances
positive mood does not lead to better creativity, while negative mood could sometimes
lead to more creative response. To attempt an explanation of these inconsistencies, others
have proposed that the purpose of emotional state is to inform an individual about the
task environment, with positive mood signaling an agreeable condition, and negative
mood indicating a problematic situation (Schwarz & Bless, 1991; Clore, Schwarz, &
Conway, 1994). Thus, negative mood fosters a more analytic, 'tight' information
processing mode, where the problem set is treated more systematically and with greater
scrutiny, while positive mood leads to a more 'relaxed', heuristic processing mode
(Fiedler, 1988, 2000).
With this in mind, bringing attention into the mood-creativity relationship helped
to explain the many inconsistencies burdening previous research. In the Stage model,
mood and arousal affect attention, causing it to broaden or narrow. In turn, attention
influences what information processing mode will be used, narrow (analytic, data driven),
or broad (heuristic, conceptually driven). Information processing requirements vary
during the different stages of creativity; a more heuristic information processing mode is
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associated with the early stages of creativity, while a more analytic information
processing mode is associated with the later stages of creativity. In this study, different
stages of creativity were simulated by the use of varied tasks that differed in their
information processing requirements for their successful completion. As predicted, broad
attention induced by means of positive low and negative high moods, promoted
performance on tasks requiring heuristic information processing, while narrow attention
induced by negative low and positive high mood, was associated with better performance
on tasks requiring a more analytic information processing mode.
Introducing differential attentional requirements for the different stages of
creativity into the emotion-creativity relationship rehabilitates the spreading activation
model explanation. Broad attention is related to the early stage of creativity, and is
associated with more conceptual, heuristic processing, when activation of greater number
of more distant nodes in a network leads to greater number of more unusual ideas being
produced. On the other hand, the activation of too many nodes in a network is detrimental
to the latter stage of creativity that is associated with more analytical processing, as it can
divert attention from the task needing scrutiny.

Implications. Implications of these findings are numerous, and are applicable to
those aspects of human endeavor concerned with understanding and nurturing creativity.
This research shows that the creative process is dependent on attentional breadth, which
in turn is reliant on differing combinations of arousal levels and emotional valence for the
fostering of the creative process at its various stages. Accordingly, new, more subtle
methods for promoting creativity may be called for. While the generation of multiple,
high-quality ideas has been traditionally considered a hallmark of creativity, stage theory
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associates idea production with the early stage of creativity, whereas the latter stage
requires a more analytical approach. This later stage has often been excluded from the
creative thinking models as non-creative. The current research illuminates the necessity
of both stages for the creative process to occur, thus emphasizing the need for both global
and local attention. Implications for this are such that not only processes requiring broad
attention, such as brainstorming, are necessary for the creativity to occur, but also more
analytical thinking associated with narrow attention is required. New methods for
fostering creativity, based on the stage model, should emphasize the importance of both
positive and negative emotions in the creative process as well as different cognitive
processes based on more global, or top down along with more local, or bottom up,
processing.

Limitations and Future Directions. The shortfall of this research is that it uses a
convenience sampling of undergraduate university students. Future research needs to
parse out the effects of emotions and arousal at the different stages of creativity using a
wider range of creativity tasks. The inclusion of people engaged in creativity in their
daily lives, such as artists, writers and scientists, may provide a more comprehensive
picture of the relationship between emotions and creativity. Future directions stemming
from this research that could elaborate on the problem of study may include mediation
analysis, investigating the role of attention as a mediator between emotions and
creativity; the use of more complex creativity measures that are more applied in their
nature; and finally, the use of more precise, physiological measures of emotions.
Overall, the pattern of results of this study provided support for the stage theory
of creativity. Both positive and negative emotions were shown to be beneficial in
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promoting creativity, though their effect was dependent on arousal. Moreover, attentional
breadth was shown to mediate the effect of emotions and arousal on the creative process.
Thus, the emotion/arousal conditions that led to a broadening of attention promoted
creativity during its early stages, while conditions that narrowed attentional breadth
fostered creativity in the latter stages. Consequently, the stage theory of creativity
provides a new way of looking at the relationship between emotions, attention and
creativity, and helps reconcile the debate of previous research regarding which emotional
valence promotes and which stifles the creative process.
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APPENDIX A
PANAS SCALE

This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions.
Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word.
Indicate to what degree you feel this way right now, that is. at the present moment. Use
the following scale to record your answers:

1
very slightly
or not at all

2
a little

interested
distressed
excited
upset
strong
guilty
scared
hostile
enthusiastic
proud

3
moderately

4
quite a bit

irritable
alert
ashamed
inspired
___ nervous
determined
attentive
jittery
active
afraid

5
extremely

101

VITA
VlKTORIA TlDIKIS (A.K.A. TlDIKYTE, TIDIKYTE-DAY)

EDUCATION
Ph.D. 2012
M.S. 2009
M.F.A. 2003
B.A.1998

Ph.D. in Applied Experimental Psychology with concentration in
Cognitive Psychology, Old Dominion University
M.S. in Applied Experimental Psychology,
Old Dominion University
M.F.A. in Media Arts Production
City College of New York, CUNY
B.A. in TV Directing, Lithuanian Theater and Music Academy

RESEARCH INTERESTS
My research interests lie in the areas of human creativity, problem solving and decision making. My
previous research investigated how gender and working within a group versus working alone affects
creative performance. My latest research investigated the mediating role of attention on the
relationship between creativity and emotions.

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE
Fall 2012-Present
Spring 2011-Present
Summer 2010-FalI 2010
Fall 2009-Spring 2010

Instructor, Human Cognition, Old Dominion University
Instructor, Theories of Personality, Old Dominion University
Instructor, Quantitative Methods, Old Dominion University
Teaching Assistant, Quantitative Methods, Old Dominion
University

UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH
Fall 2009-Present
Supervised and directed undergraduate student research. Trained undergraduate students in participant
running procedures, coding protocols, data management and analyses, experimental/statistical
software, and other data collection and analyses related tasks.

SERVICE
Spring 2012
Spring 2011
Fall 2009-present
Fall 2009-present

Peer reviewer for Creativity Research Journal
Peer reviewer for the Journal of Educational Psychology
Peer mentor
Member of Applied Experimental Psychology Student
Association (AEPSA)

COMPUTER SKILLS : Microsoft Office, SPSS (PASW), AMOS, HLM, LISREL, EQS, R, E-Prime
PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS
Spring 2010-present
Fall 2008-present

Association for Psychological Science
Phi Kappa Phi

LANGUAGES : Fluent in English, Lithuanian, and Russian, basic French and Spanish.

